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This work analyses different aspect of migration in between the first two censuses that were 
conducted in the UK in the twenty-first century. The second chapter examines the factors that 
can have an effect on the rate at which migrants in England and Wales leave the UK in order 
to return to their home country during the time period between the census of 2001 and that of 
2011. It uses a theory, initially developed by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), that attempts to 
explain why individuals from countries outside of the UK may choose to leave the country 
after their arrival. Leaving may have been pre-planned before the initial migration to the host 
nation or may be the result of poor outcomes after arrival. It is found that many of the results 
found by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in the United States are replicated in the first decade of 
the Twenty-first century for the United Kingdom. In the third chapter I investigate the reasons 
into why there is a wage gap between native and migrant workers in the UK labour market. It 
provides evidence to show that the gap in wages between the two populations can be linked to 
the composition of the migrant cohort. It also shows that as the European Union expanded 
there was a significant change in the discrimination against the migrant from the countries 


















I would like to thank everyone who has helped me to recover after my diagnosis with 
Multiple Sclerosis in 2012. This includes, but is not limited to friends, colleagues, 

























Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction         1 
 
2. Return Migration from the Host Nation     8 
2.1 Introduction        9 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Who Returns? The Outmigration of the Foreign Born 
(1996)      10 
2.2.2 Other Relevant Papers    12 
2.3 Model        18 
2.4 Data         22 
2.5 Methodology       24 
2.6 Results        27 
2.7 Conclusion        31 
 
3 Are Migrants Discriminated Against in the UK Labour Market? An Oaxaca-
Blinder Wage Decomposition.       33 
3.1 Introduction        34 
3.2 Literature Review       34 
3.2.1 A Short Review of the Literature on Discrimination
       34 
3.2.2 A Selective Review of the Wage Decomposition 
Literature      36 
3.3 Model        44 
3.4 Data         44 
3.5 Methodology       47 
3.6 Results        51 
3.6.1 All Migrants and all Natives 
3.6.1.1 OLS Results   51 
3.6.1.2 Twofold Decomposition  51 
3.6.1.3 Threefold Decomposition  55 




3.6.2.1 OLS Results   57 
3.6.2.2 Twofold Decomposition  58 
3.6.2.3 Threefold Decomposition  59 
3.6.2.4 Counterfactuals   59 
3.6.3 Female 
3.6.3.1 OLS Results   60 
3.6.3.2 Twofold Decomposition  60 
3.6.3.3 Threefold Decomposition  61 
3.6.3.4 Counterfactuals   62 
3.7 Conclusion        63 
5 Conclusion         65 
 
4 Appendix A         68 
 
5 Appendix B         74 
 
















Chapter Two Tables 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics       23 
Table 2.2 Regression upon In and Out migration rate    69 
Table 2.3 Marginal Effects of Independent Variables    70 
 
Chapter Three Tables 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Natives and Migrants 
Table 3.1.1  Total Population      75 
Table 3.1.2 Male Natives and Migrants     76 
Table 3.1.3 Female Natives and Migrants     77 
Table 3.2 Occupational Distribution of the Different Groups   78 
Table 3.3 Percentage that have Migrated from Various World Regions 79 
Table 3.4 OLS Results for Natives and Migrants (Total Populations)  80 
Table 3.5 Twofold Decomposition with Natives as the Non-discriminatory Group
           81 
Table 3.6 Threefold Wage Decomposition     82 
Table 3.7 OLS Results for Male Sample of Natives and Migrants  83 
Table 3.8 Twofold Decomposition for Male Natives and Migrants with Natives as 
Non-discriminatory Group        84 
Table3.9 Threefold Wage Decomposition for Male Natives and Migrants 85 
Table 3.10 OLS Results for Female Natives and Migrants   86 
Table 3.11 Twofold Decomposition for Female Natives as the Non-discriminatory 
Group           87 
vii 
 
Table 3.12 Threefold Wage Decomposition     88 





Figure 3.1 Wages of both Migrants and Natives     49 
 
Appendix A 
Figure 2.1 Positive Selection       71 
Figure 2.2 Negative Selection       72 






























In this thesis I study the outcomes that are achieved by the migrant population in the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) in the period between the 
censuses in 2001 and the next census that was conducted in 2011.  In this work, I 
primarily answer two questions about the migrant population within the UK.  The first 
question asks what proportion of the migrant population, who arrived during this 
period, remain at the time of the census in 2011 was conducted.  I next ask what the 
difference in earnings is between the two populations are at various points in time 
during the study period.  The results that are found in the second chapter would indicate 
that almost two-thirds of those who came to the UK over the ten year period have left 
by the time that the census information was gathered in 2011.  I discover, in the third 
chapter, that there is always a gap in the earnings between the two groups. In 2001 it 
was observed that the migrant population was earning more than the native population.  
However, by 2011 the gap has changed from migrants earning more in 2001, on 
average, to the native cohort being the group that is earning more by 2011. 
Two fundamental definitions need to be specified here as they are used throughout this 
work.  The first of these is the host country.  A host country is a country that migrants 
arrive to reside in.  This may be on a temporary basis or for permanent resettlement. 
The main host country in this work is the UK.1  Source countries could also be termed 
as countries of origin.  These are the countries where a migrant originates from and 
where they currently hold nationality.  Figure 2.3, on page 79, shows a map of where 
the source nations included in this analysis are located. 
As mentioned above the second chapter tends to agree with the original paper by Borjas 
and Bratsberg (1996).  They find that many of the migrants actually move on after a 
number of years.  This may be back to their source country or onto a third country.  In 
this work, like in the work by the original authors, I assume that if a migrant is no longer 
counted as being a resident in the UK then they have migrated back to their source 
country. 
I explore various reasons that lie behind the decision that the migrants have made to 
return to their source country.  The work in Chapter Two finds that the main reasons 
for this decision being made are the cost of migration and the disparity in the level of 
wealth between the host and source nations. 
                                                          
1 Other host countries are mentioned but these are in works by other authors. 
3 
 
The third Chapter then investigates if there is a difference in the earnings between two 
well-defined groups.  These two groups are one group of the native population and 
another group of migrants who are now resident in the UK. I examine if a gap between 
the mean earnings of the two groups exists.  If such a gap is present, the econometrics 
that I am using will be able to point to where the gap is being derived from.  I use an 
Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition in order to investigate if the migrant cohort is paid 
less than the native cohort is remunerated by.  If one group is paid less than the other 
is, then the wage decomposition will be able to show the reasons why such a gap in 
earnings may exist. 
Furthermore, Chapter Two aims to examine the factors that have an effect on the rate 
at which migrants in England and Wales leave the UK in order to return to their source 
country between the two UK censuses.  It uses the theory that was developed by Borjas 
and Bratsberg (1996).  There are a number of reasons for leaving the source nation. It 
could be that returning was pre-planned before the migrant had ever left the source 
country for their initial migration, or it could be the result of changing circumstances in 
the host or source nation, or even in both.  If the gap between the source and host nations 
has decreased then it would be expected for more migrants to want to return to their 
country of origin.  It could also be that after arrival, perhaps due to poor information or 
bad luck that a migrant may not be able to achieve what they expected to and therefore 
have returned. 
This study then estimates how much change, in a variety of factors specific to the 
economic position of the source country in relation to the host nation that the migrant 
is residing in at the time the survey was conducted, may lead to a migrant leaving the 
host nation.  I did this by applying a grouped probit model to the data that I have 
collected.  I also apply marginal effects at various means to get an estimated number of 
individuals who will engage in this type of behaviour.  
I employ a number of variables to run this regression and see which of the variables has 
the largest effect on the re-migration rate.  These variables include the gap in GDP 
between the source (or home) country and the host nation.  I also included, as 
explanatory variables, the distance between the capital of the source country and 
London, the income inequality that is present in the source country along with the 
square of this variable and the political stability in the source country.  The empirical 
4 
 
results of this regression indicates that there has been a change in the distribution of 
migrants source countries between the two censuses.  However, these results do not tell 
the reader about the size of any change in the selection that is produced by the migration 
flows. 
I examine the numbers that produce these changes in the size of migration flows and 
use marginal effects at the mean in order to investigate these.  The marginal effects of 
the various migrant populations are used in order to estimate the number of individuals 
who are engaging in migration, both arriving in and leaving from the host nation.  I 
produce three different types of marginal effects.  The different types of marginal 
effects that are employed in this chapter are the marginal effect at the mean for all 
countries, one done solely for India, the largest migrant group in 2001, and one done 
for Poland, which was the largest inflow group after 2004. 
This leads to the question of why so many individuals have chosen to migrate to the 
UK, and also then why they choose to return to their country of origin.  A variety of 
factors will attract migrants to a particular host nation.  Changes in these variables may 
lead to the opposite effect, those initial migrants deciding to return to their source 
country.  This chapter then seeks to identify those variables that draw the migrants to 
reside in the UK and then to return to their country of origin.  A more important aspect 
of migration is the type of individual that decides to migrate to and to make the UK 
their place of residence.  If the average migrant from a particular source country is 
positively selected then they would derive from the upper half of the distribution of 
skills in the country that they came from.  The opposite is true if these are negatively 
selected migrants. 
In the chapter, the work of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is applied to the UK labour 
market.  These authors find that many migrants were not migrating to the US to become 
permanent residents but were moving there for a short period before migrating back to 
their source country. Here I find that there is a similarity to the pattern that was found 
by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996).  However the overall numbers of individuals is much 
larger due to the reduced costs of travel. 
I observe that the selection that results from the return migration is dependent upon the 
selection of the initial cohort from a source country that undertook migration to the host 
nation.  To proxy for the cost of migration I use distance, and that is found to be one of 
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the most important factors affecting the migration choices that are made by individuals. 
The marginal effects for distance for the overall group show that if there is an extra 
thousand miles was added to the distance that had to be travelled then 699 more 
individuals are going to leave the UK in order to return to their source country.  A 
similar effect is observed if there is an increase in GDP with 1102.64 more people 
returning to their source country. 
The return migration just exacerbates the selection that defined the original cohort.  This 
means that those migrants who remain can be termed as the “best of the best” or the 
“worst of the worst” in those remaining individuals are from the tails of the distribution 
in skills.  Anyone who is in between those two extremes is more likely to go back to 
their country of origin. 
 
Chapter Three then investigates the reasons why there is a wage gap between the 
average worker in both the native and migrant groups in the UK labour market. In this 
chapter, all of the migrant groups from the previous chapter are amalgamated into a 
group that is defined as being all of the migrants to the UK and are studied against a 
representative group of native individuals.  It provides evidence to show the gap in 
wages between the two populations can be linked to the composition of the migrant 
cohort.  It also shows that as the European Union expanded there was a significant 
change in the wage structure that was caused by individuals from the accession states 
that joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007 arriving in the UK labour market.  
The analysis that will be performed in this chapter will be done by using the work 
Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition technique that was developed by Ronald Oaxaca 
(1973) and Alan Blinder (1973) and shows discrimination through distinct differences 
in both the returns to education and the returns to tenure that the migrant group receives, 
relative to the native cohort.  The data comes from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
for the years 2001, 2006 and 2011.2  The results from the wage decomposition show 
that there is a gradual shift away from migrants earning more than natives do, by £0.50 
in 2001, to natives earning more than migrants, by £0.48 by 2011.  This change implies 
that there has been a change in the overall wage distribution in the UK over this period. 
                                                          
2 At the end of the thesis there are also tables for the full eleven year period. 
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I also find that there is a difference in the time it takes for male workers and female 
workers, who are natives, to match the average individual from the migrant groups 
earnings and then to exceed them. Due to this, I ran two more wage decompositions.  
One of these was to decompose male wages and the other was to decompose female 
wages.3  I also attempt to show that this may have more to do with the type of job that 
individuals from the migrant group have a tendency to be employed in rather than any 
outright discrimination. The tables for the two different genders show that native males 
surpass the equivalent migrant by 2006.  Also I show that native women take longer to 
match and then surpass the average wage for migrant women.  This does not occur until 
2008, two years after native males have overtaken the equivalent group of migrant male 
workers.4 
 
The third chapter also attempts to explain why there is a fundamental change in the way 
that the wages are distributed between native and migrant workers.  In order to study 
this question we must first find a way in which to examine any discrimination that may 
exist, towards migrants, in the UK labour market.  We must first find a way in which 
to divide a representative population into two groups.  One of these groups consists of 
UK native workers, the baseline category.  The other group contains migrant workers 
who have migrated to the UK between 2001 and 2011.  This is studied by using an 
Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition technique that allowed for the investigation of any 
potential discrimination in the UK’s labour market directed primarily towards the group 
of migrants. 
This chapter seeks to explain any gap that happens to exist in the average hourly wage 
rate that is received by native and migrant workers in the UK labour market.  If any gap 
does exist in the earnings between the two groups further reasons as to why this may 
arise need to be examined. Is this due to one set of workers receiving higher wages due 
to having a higher level of skills, and is therefore better at the job, or if one set is 
rewarded at a higher rate just because they are a “preferred” group, and could therefore 
be classed as discrimination.  In order to do this I shall be employing the work of Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) and using their technique of wage decomposition to 
                                                          
3 These decompositions, as all others in this thesis is between native and migrants, be they a whole 
population or the male and female populations. 




investigate if there is negative discrimination occurring in the British labour market5 
against the migrant workforce.  The variables in the Mincer-type wage equations are 
education, experience, the square of experience, tenure and dummy variables to show 
if an individual was a migrants, married or a female.  It could also be the case that the 
migrant cohort before the two EU accessions was composed of individuals that just had 
a higher level of skills.  My look into the occupations that the two different migrant 
populations are employed in will tell the reader that the migration of Eastern Europeans 
from the accession states has changed the type of jobs that migrants are tending towards 
being employed in.  
The estimation of the decomposition for the two groups showed that two of the variables 
were the most prominent in determining the amount of wages paid to either of the 
cohorts.  The first of these variables is the amount of education that an individual has 
received.  The second of the variables that has a large effect on wages is not experience 
on its own.  It is the experience that an individual has accrued in their current job, the 
variable for which is tenure. 
Even with this, there is still a distinct difference between where the two groups find 
work.  As is shown in the appendix in Table 3.2 there is a marked increase in the number 
of migrants being employed in “elementary” occupations, with an increase from 16.9% 
to 23.1%.  This is also combined with a fall in the proportion of migrants employed in 
jobs as Managers & Directors (from 11.6% in 2001 to 4% in 2011). 
This chapter also shows how the enlargement of the EU, to include the new nations that 
joined in 2004 and 2007, has changed the wages that are being earned by the two 
groups.  I have gathered evidence that shows the type of work that these new migrants 
are being employed in compared to the native population.  In order to get a fair grasp 
of some of the changes that the accession, and the UK’s reaction to it, have been brought 
upon the UK labour market. 
In addition, I investigate a set of counterfactuals for the two populations that are being 
studied.  The counterfactuals that are presented in this chapter are taking the two 
populations endowments and applying the returns that were estimated for the other 
                                                          
5 Discrimination in the context of this chapter may refer to one group just being payed less than the 
other because they are a member of that group or that group may have characteristics that face a 
penalty in employment opportunities. 
8 
 
group.  For instance the returns that have been estimated for the native population are 
applied to the endowments that the migrant population have and from this we are able 
to calculate an estimated counterfactual wage that would represent an alternative mean 
wage if migrants were rewarded in the same way as the native population.  This is then 
also applied to the subpopulations of the two genders when they are studied separately.  
As the endowments that the migrant group tends to be larger than the native group the 
estimated counterfactuals present some interesting results.  The estimated 
counterfactuals show, at least up until 2006, that there should be a wage gap that is even 
larger than that which has been estimated between the two groups.  I show in this 
chapter that if migrants were rewarded the same way as natives they would have been 
earning 1.88 log points (£6.55) in 2001 and by 2011 it would have risen to 2.19 log 
points (£8.94).  This also happens for the two individual genders also both follow very 
similar patterns. 
Chapter Four then presents the conclusion to this thesis.  This conclusion will also point 
to avenues of further research on the topic of migration of foreign-born individuals now 






































Migration to and from the UK has always a major topic, both politically and 
economically. The coming and going of migrant populations has become even more 
important sine the expansion of the European Union. A more important aspect of 
migration is what type of individual is the average type of migrant from each country 
of origin that arrives in the UK, and what are the characteristics that these individuals 
who have migrated to the host country and have then, after a period of time, returned 
to their country of origin6 have. This is a very important part of the story behind 
migration. For instance, a country may be experiencing a labour shortage in its low tech 
manufacturing industry. If this was the case then the average migrant that the 
government should be trying to attract are those from the lower end of the skill 
distribution in the source countries, the negatively selected. However, it may actually 
be attracting the opposite type of migrant, those from the top of the source countries 
distribution of skills. 
Then what needs investigation is, given the initial flow of migrants, what is the average 
type of migrant that returns home versus the average type of migrants who becomes a 
permanent resident? 
This chapter investigates the type of selection that characterises those migrants who 
have migrated out of the UK,7 to return to their country of origin also known as the 
return migrants.8  
The first thing to do in an investigation such as this, and the primary focus of this 
chapter, is to investigate the factors that attract migrants to the UK and what factors 
may incline those migrants to decide to return to their country of origin. 
To do this a grouped probit model will be applied to a dataset that has been constructed 
from various sources. This could potentially be important for government policy on 
                                                          
6 In this paper source country is where a migrant originated from and the host country is referring to the country where the 
migrant has migrated to, in the context of this paper the host nation is the UK, in particular England and Wales.  
7 In this paper the assumption is made that if a migrant from country j is no longer counted by the Census as being in the UK then 
they must have returned back to their source country. 
 
8 For the purposes of this paper, as in many of the other papers on this topic, return migration, remigration and outward migration 




migration to the UK as individuals resident in England and Wales make up the vast 
majority of the UK population, 88.8%.9 
This chapter aims to add to the analyses done by many different authors, but does so 
with data for the UK. The investigation conducted in this chapter has not been done for 
UK for this particular period of time. This is of importance for the UK as over the time 
span that is being investigated the government policy on migration experienced two 
exogenous shocks, primarily from the accession of the EU8 and EU2 to the European 
Union and the UK governments decision not to impose transitional restrictions upon 
the accession the EU8 countries, on 01/05/2004 for the EU8. 
This chapter will also make the contribution of investigating the marginal effects of the 
grouped probit model. The marginal effects were not investigated by Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) or by any other paper that is examining the effects of the outmigration 
of individual migrants to a host nation. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 “Who Returns? The Outmigration of the Foreign Born.” (1996) 
This work is primarily based upon Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). In this paper the 
authors investigated the type of selection that characterises those migrants who become 
permanent residents in the US. The authors argue that the traditional way to think about 
migration, that those who migrate to the US are the highest skilled individuals from the 
source nation and examine the selection process that determines the skills of the 
population who have migrated and the subset of this population who have chosen to 
reside in the US on a permanent basis. Individuals may choose to leave the host country 
as their initial decision was based on a lack of information that has led them to “fail” or 
bad luck may have led to the same result, which results in the individual returning to 
their source country.  
In Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) the authors provide a mathematical formulation of 
the Roy model that was originally presented in Roy (1951).10 The authors choose to 
look into migration flows into and out of the US in the period between 1970 and 1980 
                                                          
9 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/compendiums/compendium-of-uk-statistics/population-and-migration/index.html  





and make the assumption that those not counted in the 1980 census have migrated back 
to their country of origin rather than onto a third country.11  
Three different models are used to see whether those who remain, the permanent 
migrants, are either the “best of the best” or “the worst of the worst”. The first of these 
models is a grouped probit model12 which examines how in and outmigration rates are 
affected by macroeconomic factors changing in the host and source countries.  
An augmented Mincer equation is then presented by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) which 
shows the relative incomes of the various groups13 who have migrated to and are now 
working in the USA. The final model is designed to show that as more migrants who 
are from countries that mainly provide migrants who are positively (negatively) 
selected arrive in the host nation then wages decrease (increase) for those from the same 
group who remain. The reason for this is that as more migrants arrive from positively 
selected countries then the skills of those who arrived before them are being diluted by 
the new arrivals and vice versa for those who can be characterised as being negatively 
selected. The two types of selection that can be generated through the movements of 
various groups of migrants is shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
In this chapter it will primarily be the first economic model that I am replicating.14 This 
is done using Stata’s command for grouped probit.15 I am using this model to investigate 
how the migration rate changes given changes in macroeconomic variables.16 The 
results from Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) first model have been replicated in Appendix 
Table A1. 
The augmented Mincer equation is designed to examine the average relative wage 
that is received by individuals from the various source countries. This relative wage is 
then used in the third and final model to see how changes in the migration of different 
                                                          
11 This assumption will also be used in this paper as well however the date that individuals are no longer in this country and are 
therefore assumed to be return migrants is the Census date in 2011 which is 27/03/2011 and is only for England and Wales rather 
than the whole of the UK. 
12 A Grouped Probit model works much like an individual probit model however the data is organised as blocks rather than as 
individual observations. The results should be the same as if it was done in a normal probit model. 
 
13 Groups and countries of origin are for the purposes of the paper synonymous.  
 
14 Table 2 from Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is replicated in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
15 The commands for grouped probit analysis in stata are bprobit, with generates results through Maximum Likelihood, and 
gprobit, that estimates the coefficients that are to be estimated through Weighted Least Squares (WLS).  
 
16 It is assumed that all individuals are equally affected by changes in their source countries aggregate factors equally. 
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groups have an effect on the wages earned as estimated by the augmented Mincer 
equation. 
From this third model the authors study how changes in the migration flows into 
the US may change the average wage that is received by that particular group of 
migrants. This is making the assumption that if migrants come from a country that has, 
in the past, provided highly skilled migrants then those who follow will tend to be the 
same as those who arrived in previous periods. This final model then allows the authors 
to draw the conclusion that those migrants who remain are either the very best or the 
very worst individuals in terms of skills. 
One of the major drawbacks of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is that in their paper 
they only present the coefficients from their grouped probit. However probit 
coefficients, by themselves, only specifies the direction of any effect. In order to fully 
investigate the migration flows into and out of any country using a probit model I must 
look into the marginal effects of the model. The marginal effects are be presented in the 
results section in Table 2.2. 
2.2.2 Selection Papers 
Roy (1951) provides the seminal work on the process that determines the selection that 
would be observed given a number of assumptions about some hypothetical society. In 
this society there are only two occupations, hunting and fishing. Hunting is much easier 
than fishing, but has a much lower spread in the potential output. As fishing is harder, 
relative to hunting, and can potentially lead to a much larger output it is likely that those 
who fish are going to be better off than those who hunt. However how the two skill sets 
mix with individuals in society is another major concern. If skill in hunting and fishing 
are positively correlated with each other, then those who are good hunters are likely to 
fish given the potential rewards that fishing can bring. Even if they are negatively 
correlated then those who are only just below average at both tasks are likely to take up 
fishing as an occupation due to the potential rewards being higher for fishing than for 
hunting. This pattern of behaviour remains even after the society is extended to have 
more occupations. The main thrust is that the variance of potential output gets higher 
with the increase in skill level required. 
Willis and Rosen (1979) examine the self-selection that occurs between those that do 
attend college and those that do not.  The authors hypothesise that the decision is based 
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upon an individual’s evaluation of their potential earnings given their choice of whether 
to attend college or not. The authors find that there is positive selection bias in the 
results of their probit estimation in both groupings of actual outcomes. The results 
would indicate that, on average, the correct selection was made, those that choose B 
over A earned more than if they had chosen A instead, even with identical 
characteristics. The downside of this paper, which is admitted to by the authors 
themselves, is that the data may well come from a source, military records, that would 
give somewhat biased characteristics, and that the observations were only included if 
they had provided the information on their first recorded income.   
Selection in the context of membership of trade unions is examined in Lee (1978). In 
his paper he finds that those who join trade unions are of a higher skilled group than 
those who do not. Miller (1984) also finds a similar pattern but just for employment. 
Those who survive in the job longer, have a longer tenure, tend to be those who are best 
suited for the job. This may be due to the individual gaining some form of enjoyment 
from the job or having been weeded out by the company as not being productive 
enough, relative to what the company’s initial expectations for this particular employee.  
Many of the papers in the migration literature also look into the selection process that 
decides on the type of individual who does end up as being a migrant or even for those 
that choose to return to their country of origin, those who are return migrants. 
Chiswick (1999) finds that the type of selection that characterises the migrants that he 
was studying tended to be decided by the costs that would be incurred during and after 
migration. He found that the average migrant would tend to be positively selected. This 
is due to not just the fact that those individuals would be better able to afford the 
monetary cost of any migration, but would also be better at adapting to the new 
surroundings that they were presented with after the actual migration (this would 
include, but is not limited to, being in a better position in which to learn a new 
language). These findings are much less pronounced in political and tied migrants as 
they had much less choice in where migration would leave them and why they were 
migrating.17 
                                                          
17 Political migrants migrate on the basis of changing political regimes in the source country that may affect them, either 
religiously or politically. Tied migrants generally migrate as another family member has migrated and they have chosen to 
migrate along with that individual. 
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Later in the paper Chiswick gives a formal presentation of a model that shows how this 
situation may arise naturally. Even when the opportunities are equal in both countries 
for those of differing ability, in this paper the author only defines migrants as being 
high or low skilled, it will be the case that most migrants will be positively selected. 
The reason for this is that even if the direct costs associated with migration do not vary 
given the individuals level of ability there will be an advantage for those with higher 
ability in terms of efficiency of migrating. This may also, but not necessarily mean, that 
those who are more efficient in the migration process will earn more than those who 
not as efficient, although this would be clear.18 One thing that does become apparent is 
that migration cost can never be considered as being the same for every individual from 
a source country. Even if the direct out of pocket costs are identical the opportunity cost 
will be larger for those with a higher level of skills. This is the case as the earnings that 
are forgone will be larger for those that are in the high skilled category than for those 
in the category of those with a lower level of skills. The main drawback, identified by 
the author himself, is that this paper does not work with the observed outcomes for any 
individual migrant or group of migrants.  
Then there are papers that investigate the selection of those individuals who do choose 
to migrate. An early paper that looked into both migration and selection was Borjas 
(1987). Like Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Borjas (1987) uses a mathematical 
formalisation of the Roy model to investigate the self-selection that determines the level 
of skills that the average migrant brings from their country of origin.  
In this paper the author is only investigating one direction of travel of migrants and not 
the possible return or migrations onto third countries. The author wishes to show that 
the selection of the migrants by skill level is determined by the economic variables in 
the source country relative to those same variables in the US. The author claims that 
the level of economic inequality in earnings, relative to that observed in the US, will 
determines the average type of migrant from a specific source country that will arrive 
in the US. For migrants to be viewed as being positively selected, high skilled, one 
condition needs to be met. The wage structure in the origin country has to be less 
unequal in the source country than it is in the US. This will mean that those with high 
levels of skills could do better in the US than they could do at home. For migrants to be 
                                                          
18 Those who are more efficient in migration are those with higher levels of skills than those who are not as efficient. 
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negatively selected the opposite needs to be true, it must be the case that income is more 
unequally divided at home then it is in the US. If this is the case migrating is used as a 
form of insurance given the level of skills of the migrant and we observe a migration 
flow that is negatively selected. 
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) give a formal critique of Borjas (1987). In this paper they 
criticise Borjas’ use of income accruing to the top 10% over that accruing to the bottom 
20% as being the main way to observe whether a migration flow is positively or 
negatively selected. They also criticise the selection of countries which are selected as 
the origins of migrant flows. They continue to claim that Borjas has used an unseen 
selection criteria when deciding on which countries to include and which to exclude.   
Another paper that uses the model developed by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is that 
done by Co, Yun and Gang (1998). This confirms the predictions of the original paper 
in their examination of migration, both into and out of the Hungarian economy. The 
authors use the Hungarian Household Panel Survey (HHPS) drawn from the panels of 
1993 and 1994, as these panels were the first to ask if the individuals surveyed had any 
experience of working abroad. They also restrict their sample to only those of working 
age when they were surveyed. After accounting for the self-selection the authors find 
that men have a 4% wage premium and women a wage premium of 45% for those who 
have worked abroad in comparison to those who stayed. They also find that for those 
who work in wholly Hungarian owned firms suffer from a wage penalty of 30% and 
27% for men and women respectively. These results are obtained through estimation 
by maximum likelihood. They also report estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Generally the estimation by OLS gives some quite different results to that when the 
estimation is run with Maximum Likelihood. The Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) gives a fairly significant difference of the earnings of those who have gone and 
worked abroad. For men the estimation gives a result that is significantly lower than 
that when the estimation is done with OLS. For women the opposite tends to occur. The 
overestimation of male earnings, after they arrive back from being abroad is to be 
expected when using OLS and MLE. However, for women there is a jump in the relative 
earnings for those who have worked abroad versus the women who have never left 
Hungary in order to work. The authors state that this could be due to unobservable 
characteristics of the female return migrant population. They state that these 
characteristics may make the women less desirable in the Hungarian Labour market 
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when compared to the labour markets in foreign countries.19 They, however, do not 
look into what these attributes are and the value of them. 
Rooth and Saarela (2006) attempt to investigate the selection that results from the 
migration between Finland and Sweden. As Finland has a much higher return to formal 
education than Sweden (9% per year in Finland versus 4% per year in Sweden) those 
who migrate from Finland to Sweden are the migrants that are generally characterised 
as being negatively selected. The theory given in Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is again 
confirmed by the author’s investigation of those migrants who return back to Sweden 
by 1995. The return migration results in an accentuation of the selection process. Those 
that end up returning can be considered as the “best of the worst” of those that were 
closest to being the marginal migrants. 
Another paper that is primarily based on Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is that done by 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). In this paper the authors aim to investigate the effect that 
return migrants have on the source country after their return. They also examine 
whether the results that are to be expected hold true. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) state 
that if a source nation has a tighter wage distribution that is more centred around its 
mean and has a higher rate of return to skills, then the migrants will, on average, be 
more likely to be positively selected. This should imply that migrants to the USA from 
Mexico should be negatively selected, due primarily to the levels of income inequality. 
The migrants from Mexico should therefore be negatively selected. 
However once the wage distributions are examined for Mexican natives in Mexico and 
those who have migrated, the authors conclude that the migration from Mexico to the 
US has been mostly from the middle to upper middle part of the distribution. This would 
then imply that those who do migrate are not simply negatively or positively selected 
but somewhere in between. Upon their return to Mexico these return migrants would 
normally fall into the upper or the upper middle parts of the migrant earnings 
distribution 
Barrett and O'Connell (2000) set out to find the outcomes faced by Irish migrants if 
they choose to return home after time spent abroad. The author follows Co, Gang and 
Yun (1998) in order to test to see if migrants from Ireland in the 1990's receive a wage 
                                                          
19 The authors do not mention the exact foreign countries that the migrants tend to be heading to. They only mention, and have 
dummy variables that account for, if the individual has gone to OECD countries in Europe, OECD countries outwith of Europe 
and non-OECD countries. 
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premium upon their return. The authors identify a number of waves of migration that 
occurred in Ireland during the late 20th century. They identify those who graduated from 
third level colleges in 1992 as being the most suitable group to examine.  The beginning 
of this research tries to identify those who tend to migrate. The author supposes that, 
much like in the 1980's the migrants will tend to be highly educated. 
The results published by the authors, after correcting for gender, show that men make 
a significant premium for migrating out of Ireland and then returning. However women 
earn about the same as if they had never migrated. 
The authors also propose some alternative explanations as to why the return migrants 
tend to earn more than those who never migrated. One of their explanations as to why 
there might be a significant wage gap between the two populations is that the very fact 
that these people have migrated could be interpreted by employers that these individuals 
have better unobserved characteristics that would be desirable in the domestic labour 
market. In the paper they also report, from their own survey, why many people chose 
to migrate. By far the largest proportion of individuals who migrated said that they did 
so for “adventure” rather than for better labour market outcomes. There is potential bias 
in their results looking into the selection of the migrants as they are only looking into 
individuals who graduated from college or university meaning that the individuals are 
more likely to be positively selected. 
In their paper De Coulon and Piracha (2004) attempt to use the model developed by 
Borjas and Bratsberg to investigate how emigration affects the source country. The 
authors apply the model developed by Borjas and Bratsberg to persons who have 
migrated abroad and then have chosen to return to Albania, however when investigating 
the selection that characterises migrants they apply the econometric models developed 
by Lee (1978, 1982). This approach allows the authors to be able to calculate the mean 
conditional wages of those who stayed in Albania and those migrants who left but then 
returned at a later date. This is especially useful in an Albanian context as much of the 
population have engaged in some form of return migration. They also use a semi 
parametric approached that was developed by DiNardo et al (1996) in order to estimate 
the change that migration has had on the wage distribution of Albania. They do this in 
order to examine the whole wage distribution for both return migrants and those who 
stayed in Albania. It is concluded that many of the migrants who derive from Albania 
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were negatively selected. The authors then posit the idea that if the stayers had chosen 
to migrate they would be earning much more. The reason, as proposed by De Coulon 
and Piracha, is that if the higher skilled did migrate then they would face much higher 
costs in their migration but would have also receive a higher payoff upon returning to 
Albania. Then they would, in all likelihood, have received some form of training on 
parts of the job that would require foreign language skills whereas those with a lower 
level of skills, and therefore working in more routine jobs, may not be required to have 
as much training in the host countries language.  
There are also a number of other papers that discuss migration, both internationally and 
within states, but do not use the Roy model in order to investigate the effects of 
selection. 
Interprovincial migration in Canada is studied by Robinson and Tomes (1982). They 
find that the expected outcomes from migration, moving from low income states to high 
income states, is generally supported by their findings.  Also highlighted in the paper 
are the effects of native language on migration outcomes. Those who only speak French 
are less likely to engage in migration than those who are bilingual or English speakers. 
Zhoa (2002) examines migration within China, mostly rural to urban and then the return 
trips made by the original cohorts of migrants. A big reason for this study was the 
response of cities in China to large migration flows into their area. The response was 
designed to deter migrants from arriving in these cities or to convince those that had 
that returning may be their best option. However the paper also shows that many of the 
migrants did not return home but migrated onto a third area. The main reason for 
migration, as hypothesised by the author, is primarily the lack of non-farm economic 
activity that can be undertaken by individuals within the town, the choice in effect falls 
to that between migration and the non-farm economic activity that there is. 
Also, after their return, migrants are more likely to invest in farming equipment than 
are those individuals who have never migrated. This is primarily due to the fact that 





The model that is to be applied in this paper is an adaptation of the Borjas Selection 
model that was initially presented in Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants 
(1987). The model was adapted by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in order to incorporate 
for the flow of return migrants from the host country back to the source country. Three 
equations are required in order to describe the log wage distributions for the three 
different groups.20 
𝑤0 = 𝜇0 + 𝜂𝑣          (1) 
𝑤1 = 𝜇1 + 𝑣 + 𝜀         (2) 
𝑤10 = 𝜋𝑤1 + (1 − 𝜋)(𝑤0 + 𝜅)       (3) 
For clarity, I assume that w0 refers to the log wage earned in the source country where 
an individual originates from and w1 gives the same but for the migrants in the host 
country, which for the remainder of this chapter is the United Kingdom. When we are 
describing the log wages faced by those who are engaging in return migration, I refer 
to w10 that represents the log wage distribution in both countries faced by those who do 
return. In these equations µ0 describes the mean wage in the source country and in the 
host country the mean wage, µ1, would be observed, if all individuals from the source 
nation migrated to the host country. The symbols v and ε are both deviations from the 
mean income. In this way v can be thought of as transferable skills, across borders, 
however ε has a better interpretation as misinformation in the migration decision or the 
luck of any particular individual. From these two facts we can state that the parameter 
v is known to anyone considering migration but ε remains unknown to all individuals. 
The other part in equation (1) that needs to be defined is η which is simply the rate of 
return to skills in the source country relative to the host. The final equation, equation 
(3), the log wage distribution for those individuals who first engage in migration from 
the source to the host country and then after a fixed period of time, described by the 
parameter π, upon return to their source country. If this does happen for any individual, 
it is assumed that there is a reward for spending part of the working life in another 
country. This reward is defined as κ and is to be thought of as a percentage above µ0. 
At this point two additional assumptions must be introduced. The first of these is that 
for an initial migration to occur this would be at the beginning of said individuals 
working life. The next is that, as mentioned earlier, the length of time spent in the host 
                                                          
20 The three groups are non-migrants and return migrants but also one-way migrants, those who move abroad but do not return. 
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country by an individual, π, is constant. This then implies that any individual engaging 
in the initial migration decision is doing so at the age they were at the start of their 
working life plus π years. 
These migration decisions are reached once any individual has incorporated in actual 
costs that would be involved in the migration or the migration and remigration 
decisions. In the previous papers by Borjas21 these migration costs were calculated as 
time equivalent costs. This means the easiest way to define the initial cost of migration 
is as M=Cm/w0 and in terms of the costs of return migration as R=Cr/w0. In these two 
cost functions Cm and Cr are the actually costs, in terms of pound sterling, that the 
individual would have to pay in order to arrive at the required destination. We can now 
state what conditions must apply in order for any individual to migrate or given that 
they have initially migrated to then engage in return migration. The initial migration 
decision would occur if: 
max[E𝑤1 − 𝑀, 𝐸𝑤10 − 𝑀 − 𝑅] > 𝑤0      (4) 
Return migration would then occur if the above were true with the extra condition: 
max[𝐸𝑤0 − 𝑅, 𝐸𝑤10 − 𝑅] > 𝑤1       (5) 
Equation (4) states that an individual chooses to migrate if the expected wage in the 
host country minus any migration costs exceeds what is currently available to them in 
the source country. For those who, after period π has come to an end, choose to return 
to the host country then the wage upon return minus the costs of both migrations must 
exceed what is currently available in the source country. Equation (5) then states the 
conditions that must arise for any individual to engage in return migration and 
incorporates the two possible time frames for return migration. If the individual “fails” 
in the host country, they have drawn from the distribution of g(ε) a significantly bad 
outcome, then they immediately return to the source nation. However if they get an 
outcome, that can be thought of as beneficial to the migrant,  from their draw from the 
distribution g(ε) then these individuals may engage in return migration if the expected 
wage upon return exceeds what they were making in the host country minus any costs 
incurred due to the decision to remigrate. 
                                                          
21 Borjas (1987) & Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) 
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For an initial migration decision to be changed into a return migration decision, in order 
for some investment to be made, we must add an additional assumption. This additional 
assumption will then assume that the returns to re-migration, κ, must exceed any costs 
that are incurred by moving between countries. 
𝜅 > 𝑀 + 𝑅
1−𝜋
          (6) 
Equations (4) and (5) can then be rearranged so that we can apply some sorting in 
equilibrium conditions. If an individual does decide not to migrate then it must be the 
case that: 
(1 − 𝜂)𝑣 ≤ (µ0 − µ1 + 𝜅) +
𝑀+𝑅−𝜅
𝜋
       (7) 
For all those who wish to migrate to the host country then it must be that the opposite 
of the (7) is true such that: 
(1 − 𝜂)𝑣 > (µ0 − µ1 + 𝜅) +
𝑀+𝑅−𝜅
𝜋
       (8) 
Then we need a third equation to describe the behaviour of those who end up conducting 
return migration: 
(µ0 − µ1 + 𝜅) +
𝑀+𝑅−𝜅
𝜋
< (1 − 𝜂)𝑣 < (µ0 − µ1 + 𝜅) +
𝑅
1−𝜋
− 𝜀   (9) 
It has now become obvious that the critical value that describes the selection that 
characterises migrants from a certain country is η. The value that η takes describes the 
average type of migrant that arrives in the host nation from any given source country. 
If η takes a value that is less than 1 then the average migrant could be described as being 
positively selected. This means that such an individual has been drawn from those 
individuals that are more than the average skill level when we examine the source 
countries distribution of skills. If this is the case then the migrants who return to the 
source country will be the least skilled of this current sub sample. They return as 
conditions at home, the source country, improve or if w10 ends up being greater for them 
than w1 currently is. This will mainly be derived from the improvement in their wage 
in the source country granted by time earning a wage in the host country, and is 
represented by κ. Then it follows that those who only engage in one time migration tend 
to be those who are drawn from the very top of the sub-sample that did migrate to the 
host nation, if the flow from that particular nation is positively selected.  
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The opposite is true if η>1. If this is the case then the initial migrants will generally be 
characterised as being from the lower end of the source countries skill distribution, they 
can be classed as being negatively selected. Again it is those closest to the mean in the 
source country that could be considered as marginal migrants, those most likely to 
remigrate due to an improvement in the income they would earn upon return, κ, or due 
to a change in the situation in the source or host countries. 
If both of these selection procedures are true then the return migration is acting to 
further the process of selection over the initial group of migrants in the host country. 
The authors of the original paper on this pointed to the fact that the further selection 
that occurs due to outmigration means that the host nation will be left with workers who 
are “the best of the best” or “the worst of the worst.” 
The above equations allow us to formulate the return migration probability function. 
This function is simply equation (8) and equation (9) formed into a fraction with (8) as 












     (10) 
It is easy to show that for this equation, with no other assumptions, the derivatives for 












> 0      (11) 
These would imply that an increase in the costs of any direction of migration would 
decrease the amount of migrants travelling from any source country to the host nation. 
The wage premium upon return to the source nation would increase the outmigration 
rate from the host country as κ increases. 
For this chapter, as in Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), I am making the assumption that 
those migrants who are no longer in the host country at time t' have returned to their 
source country. We are effectively excluding the possibility that the individuals have 
migrated onto a third country and are going to make the assumption that if an individual 
no longer appears in the records of the host country then they must have returned to 
their source country. 
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An assumption that is also required is that the populations of any source country are 
risk neutral. If it was assumed that they were risk averse, then, given the model that has 
just been derived nobody would want to migrate. This would be due to the migrants not 
wishing to engage in the random draw that would be part of determining their wages. 
If on the other hand a countries population are to be considered as being risk lovers then 
it would be expected that the whole population of the source country would engage in 
migration. They would no longer be apprehensive of the result of the random draw from 
g(ε) as the migrant would be able to engage in return migration, or migrate onto a third 
country, if the draw from the distribution g(ε) was not actually a positive or a neutral 
result. 
2.4 Data 
The data required for this investigation, into the outmigration rate of foreign nationals 
from England and Wales, is extensive. For the data on the dependent variable, if 
individuals have returned back to their source country or not, we need to consult two 
separate sources of information. Data on the inflow from any single country was 
obtained from the DWP (Department for Work and Pensions), which can be broken 
down into data on the inflow from specific countries.22 The implication of this, due to 
the lack of information on the individuals other than just the raw number of individuals 
who have been allocated a NiNo number, is that a grouped approach needs to be 
employed. The data gathered from the DWP represents the overall inflow of 
individuals, from foreign countries, in the time period t.  
The other data source required for the dependent variables are those who are left in the 
country by the census date in 2011 and who arrived after the census date in 2001 and 
this is obtained from the 2011 UK census and represents those individuals that are still 
in the UK at time period t'. This was obtained from the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS).23 This then allows for a calculation of those individuals who can be considered 
successes in term of probit, those who returned home.24 This then allows the dependent 
                                                          
22 NiNo allocated to foreign can be obtained through Stat-X on https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-insurance-
number-allocations-to-adult-overseas-nationals-entering-the-uk  
 
23 These numbers were obtained on request from the ONS in Table CT0111 which details the number of recorded individuals, by 
passport held, that are in the country on 27/03/11 and are between the ages of 25 to 64. 




variable to represent the percentage of those from any one country who have engaged 
in remigration. 
Other data that needed to be obtained are for the macroeconomic variables and therefore 
require different sources of data that is shared by individuals within a group.25 A 
variable that is not actually shared by all in the group is distance. However in this 
context we make the assumption that the distance between the capital of the source 
country and London is a close enough approximation. This variable measures the 
distance between the capital of the source country and London in term of thousands of 
miles and is used as a proxy for the cost of migration.  
Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Various Nations 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Inflow I(t) 
 
Census Final Stock R(t’) 
 
Outmigration Rate q(t, t’) 
 
Log GDP Gap 
 







































































Note: t represents the period of time when migrants are arriving in the UK. t’ represents the point in time at the end of the analysis 
to represents the number of migrants that are still in the UK.q(t,t’) represents the outmigration rate for each individual group. 
 
Another of these variables is the gap in the level of GDP between the source country 
and the GDP of the United Kingdom. This is calculated by dividing the level of the 
GDP in the source country by the level of GDP in the UK. The data for this variable 
was obtained from UN estimates26 of GDP for 2011. 
Relative income inequality is also a factor that may well cause movements in population 
in ways that are described by the model. The information for this variable was obtained 
from the UN Human Development Report published in 2009.27 This report gives details 
of the national income in any country and the percentage that is accrued by the top 10% 
                                                          
25 In this paper the groups represent different nationalities. 
26 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=GDP+per+capita&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a101%3bcurrID%3aUSD%3bpcFlag%3a1  




and that which accrues to the bottom 10%. These numbers are then used, in the same 
way as in Borjas & Bratsberg (1996), but they use the income being made by the bottom 
20%. These numbers are then placed into a fraction, with the income accruing to the 
top as the numerator and that being made by those at the bottom as the denominator. 
This then provides a single value that is used to represent the inequality in the 
distribution of income, which is theorised to have an effect on the rate at which migrants 
decide to return home. Even though this variable does not change, as a fixed point in 
time is used, it should be able to be used as a representation of the gap in the inequality 
of income. 
The political stability of a country is also a major factor in an individual’s decision 
about the country in which he or she is willing to reside. The data for this variable was 
obtained from The Failed States Index of 2011.28 This index provides a number for the 
perceived stability of a nation’s political structure. The score for any single country is 
the addition of scores for many different factors. This includes demographic pressures, 
human flight, legitimacy of the state and many others, However in this study the score 
for human flight has been removed as it includes what is actually being investigated by 
this current study. 
2.5 Methodology 
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) investigate the selection of migrants who move from the 
USA back to their countries of origin.29 In their paper they study how a number of 
macroeconomic variables may have an effect on an individual’s decision to migrate for 
a second time in order to return home30 by t'. I used the framework presented here in 
this paper in order to examine why migrants who come to the UK may choose to return 
to their source country. 
In order to study why these individuals decided to leave the host nation a probit model 
was run on the data described in section 2.4 of this work. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the variables that have the largest effect on rates of remigration. This chapter 
will explore how the same factors, as used in Borjas and Bratsberg’s paper, may affect 
                                                          
28 http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2011-sortable 
 
29Borjas & Bratsberg (1996), Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign Born, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
78(1), 165-176. 
30 The economic variables of interest are the source countries GDP, its political stability, distance between the source country and 




migrants in England and Wales, and how changes in these variables may change their 
decision of being resident in the UK due to the changing situations in their source and 
the host countries.31 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,                   𝑦𝑖 = 1[𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0]     (12) 
Equation (12) is the index function for the probit model. As yi
* is not observed in the 
data an index function is required. If yi
* is less than or equal to 0 then we set yi as being 
equal to 0. If yi
* is greater than 0 then we assume that yi is equal to 1. All of the variables 
that will be used to examine the effect on the dependent variable are contained in the 
vector xi, while the error term for the model is εi. The probit model uses the standard 
normal distribution and therefor the variance of the error term is equal to 1. In this 
model observations of the variables that are assumed to have an effect on the probability 
of whether an individual will decide to return to their source country and are included 
to explain why individuals choose to return home or not. 
A number of other assumptions also need to be satisfied if I am to run a probit model. 
The error tem, εi, is assumed to be equal to zero. The error term is homoscedastic in the 
model. Another assumption is that each observation is independent of all on the other 
observations.  
In a probit model the coefficients cannot be easily interpreted. Instead we need to look 
at the marginal effects that have been produced by the dependent variables by changes 
in the explanatory variables. I also take account of the various functional forms that any 
equation being estimated contains. 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥2
2+𝛽4log (𝑥3)   (13) 
Equation (13) gives a simplified version of the model that is present in Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) which contains the 3 functional forms that I have encountered in the 
grouped probit model that is ran in this paper. Those functional forms are linear in x1, 
quadratic in x2 and logarithmic in x3. In order to obtain the marginal effects the partial 
differentials must be taken for each term, and are shown below. 
The marginal effect for x1 is below in equation (14). 
                                                          
31 It is assumed that if someone is no longer counted as being in England or Wales as recorded by the national census in 2011 has 





= 𝜙(𝑥𝛽)𝛽1        (14) 
In equation (14) we are presented with the partial derivative for the coefficient of x1. In 
the equation above ϕ(.) represents the pdf of the standard normal distribution. As can 
be seen in equation (14) this is substantially different from the standard OLS coefficient 
that would be associated with x1 which would be just β1. This is primarily due to the 




= 𝜙(𝑥𝛽)(𝛽2 + 2𝛽3𝑥2)               (15) 
Equation (15) above shows the marginal effect for the quadratic term that appears in 
equation (13) or any other quadratic term that may appear in a model that is to be 






)            (16) 
The above equation, equation (16) gives the marginal effect for any logarithmic 
variable, such as x3 in equation (13). 
One of the major advantages of using marginal effects is that one may examine the 
marginal effect at different points in the distribution. In this paper I will be examining 
the variables at their means, when x=?̅?. This is also the case when we are examining 
the individual groups. When this is done I am not looking at the overall average for the 
whole data set but at the mean for a particular variable in that group. 
The number of groups in the dataset is: 
𝑛𝑔 = #𝑔         (17) 
This equation is stating that each observation, ngi, where each i is part of a group, g. 
𝑦𝑔𝑖 = 𝑋𝑔𝑖
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑔𝑖        (18) 
Equation (18) gives the model that will be estimated by grouped probit where 
individuals within a group are indexed by i and the different groups are indexed by g. 
Each individual within a group has the same covariates as the other individuals, as the 
variables in Xgi=Xg as they are macroeconomic variables and therefore do not vary 
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across individuals within the same group. This means that the equation that will be 
estimated is slightly different from equation (18). 
𝑦𝑔 = 𝑋𝑔
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑔        (19) 
This causes issues in the estimation process, which will need to be resolved. In this 
paper I employ two of these in the estimation process. The first that will be employed 
is using errors that are robust to the effects of clustering and then weighted least squares 
is also be used. Clustering will not affect the values of the coefficients, however it will 
affect the standard errors of the model that is being estimated. We can apply an estimate 
of the variance that does not rely on the assumption that the errors in a group, or cluster, 





′𝑋)−1      (20) 
The variance is estimated with equation (20).32 This equation allows for correlation 
between individuals within a group, but still maintains the assumption that individuals 
in different groups are uncorrelated with each other. In equation (20) φj is the within 
cluster weighted sums of the contributions to δygi/δβgi and allows for the correlation 
between individuals within the same group j. φj is equal to Σj=1
MXj’uj.  
The major drawback of using cluster robust variance estimation is that it can be 
inconsistent when the number of clusters is small.33 However the number of clusters is 
considered to be small when it is about 30 or 40 clusters. This paper has 93 groups each 
of which can be considered a cluster. 
The other method is to apply weighted least squares (WLS hereafter). This is required 
as OLS will be inefficient in the estimation of equation (19) due to the 
heteroscedasticity within the model. In order to do this each observation is weighted by 
some other variable. Stata allows weighting by the raw number of observations within 
a group, both the “successes” and the “failures.” The variance for this is then estimated 
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In equation (21)34 we have pg, the percentage of “successes”, ng, the overall numbers of 
individuals within a group, ϕg is the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
and Φ is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
Once equation (21) has been estimated then the model may be estimated with 1/σj
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being used to weight the different groups. This should, like with the cluster robust 
estimate of the variance, allow for a more efficient estimation of the coefficients. 
2.6 Results 
I show the results from the regression of log wages on a number of macroeconomic 
factors in Table 2.1. The first of these methods is via approximating the variance using 
cluster robust variance estimation. This was discussed in the methodology (2.5) section 
of this chapter. Another way that the clustering of errors can be overcome is to employ 
weighted least squares. This was also discussed in the methodology section of this 
chapter. When Table 2.1 is examined, it can be seen that the cluster robust estimation 
is done in column (2) of Table 2.1 for the outmigration rate and column (5) for the 
immigration rate. The columns of the table that used weighted least squares are column 
(3) for the out-migration rate and column (6) for the rate of immigration. 
As can be seen in the results many of the estimated coefficients have a high degree of 
volatility in their estimated standard errors, in the various estimations, that is being 
caused by the correlation of the errors for the individuals in one group. This is primarily 
due to the issue of all the observations of individuals, indexed by i in equation (18), all 
sharing the same variable values in each country of origin that is indexed by the 
subscript g and hence driving a clustering of the error term. The different ways to 
correct for this are cluster robust variance estimation and weighted least squares, both 
bring the t statistics, and there for the standard errors, to a much more plausible level. 
These results only point to the direction of travel and I had estimate the marginal effects 
for these to be able to represent a number of individuals that are affected by such a 
change. As was mentioned in the methodology section I do this through taking the 
partial derivatives of the various estimated coefficients. This is easily done through 




most statistical packages.35 The results for the marginal effects are presented in Table 
2.2. 
In Table 2.2 we can see how the various factors would affect the number of migrants 
engaging in return migration if any of these variables increases. Much like in the 
previous table, Table 2.1, the differing specifications give similar numbers for those 
wishing to return home, given an increase in any of the individual factors that are 
theorised to affect the flow of migrants, however the issue is again the standard errors 
assigned to these factors when it is being estimated by the standard grouped probit. 
It can be seen from the estimations that are presented in Table 1.2 that the estimation 
with the most consistent standard errors are presented in those columns that estimate 
the standard errors using cluster robust estimation of the variance or weighted least 
squares. It can be seen from these columns that the most important factors regarding 
the estimated variables are distance and the gap in GDP between the two countries. 
Distance, which as mentioned before is a proxy for the cost of migration, has an 
estimated value of -0.182. The table shows the reader that as the cost of the migration 
increases there will be fewer individuals willing to engage in migrating to the host 
country. 
The gap in the logs of GDP also has a high level of significance in its estimation. The 
value that was estimated in the grouped probit estimation was 0.0781. This would 
indicate that as the gap in GDP between the host and source country increases there are 
more individuals wanting to move to the UK. 
There are also the estimates of how income inequality can have an effect on the outward 
migration of those who have already migrated to the UK. It can be seen from Table 1.2 
that the value that has been estimated in column (2) is only 0.0495. If this is compared 
to the same variable, but for the rate of immigration, it can be seen that this is much 
larger than it is for the rate of return migration to the various source countries with the 
coefficient that is estimated for this being equal to 0.0772. 
We can now look into the estimated numbers for the immigration rate and how the 
variables have an effect on it. Those who have migrated to the UK and plan to go back 
                                                          
35 The command for marginal effects in Stata is “margins” and the command that was used in this study to examine the marginal 
effect at the mean, by group, was “margins, dydx(*) atmeans over (ccode)”. 
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are less likely to return to a poor country, one that has had a coup or a revolution in the 
recent past and one that will cost them more to travel to. Most of the estimates from this 
regression have a negative sign before the estimated number. This shows that as the 
values for these variables increase individuals are less likely to want to return. 
All of the other variables in Table 2.1 are significant, but only at the lower threshold of 
25% level of significance as derived from their standard errors. This implies that the 
estimates of the other variables need to be used in helping to explain the changes in 
migration rates but are still not representing the full story. 
The estimated values for the rate at which individuals immigrate are both, relatively, 
larger and more precisely estimated. If we stay focused on the WLS estimation it can 
be seen that the estimated value for income inequality on the immigration rate is 0.0272. 
This can be compared with the score that this variable receives for the outmigration rate 
which are much lower than those estimated for the rate of return migration. 
The gap in the level of GDP, as measured in 2011, does provide evidence that an 
increase in the GDP of the source country would lead to more migrants returning to 
their home country. This is confirmed in the marginal effects of an increase in the gap 
between host and source countries level of GDP. Marginal effects, given the weighted 
least squares specification, would indicate that an increase in the level of GDP in the 
source country would lead 926 more individuals deciding to return to their source 
country. Looking into the two source countries that are specified in Table 1.4 would 
indicate that if GDP increased in Poland then there would be over 14000 more Poles 
willing to return home, whereas only 7661 more Indians would return due to an increase 
in the GDP of India.36 
The stability of the source countries political regime is also a major factor when 
individuals are making decisions about their migration strategies. It is theorised by 
Borjas and Bratsberg that a more stable political system in the home nation may result 
in more individuals returning to their home country or just less people leaving the 
source country. The coefficients estimated by the model would indicate that this is 
correct, even though the t stat for it would indicate that it is only significant at the 25% 
                                                          




level which could easily imply that the true value for the coefficient for this is actually 
zero.  
The marginal effects for this variable indicates that 42 more people would choose to 
migrate back home if the score for political stability increases. Once the marginal effect, 
at the mean is examined for Poland and India we get a better idea of the effects of 
political stability on the migration rate. If we examine a change in the political stability 
score, that would indicate that 662 Poles would choose to return while if India’s score 
for political stability increased then by the same amount then 350 more Indians would 
choose to migrate back to India. This becomes clear as the score for political stability 
increases as nation become more politically unstable so any increase in the score of 
political stability can be viewed, in reality, as an increase in political instability and 
therefor an increase in the score for this variable would be more likely to induce less 
people to return to that source country. 
The last variable to be examined is Income Inequality. An increase in the unequal 
distribution of income may work both ways. The theory would indicate that an 
individual’s decision to migrate based on the level of income inequality is dependent 
on the average selection of the individual migrant from country g. The score that is 
given by the model, no matter its specification, would indicate that income inequality 
is not a factor that individuals would base the intentions to migrate based on.37 However 
once the marginal effects are investigated we get a better picture of the actual effect. 
The marginal effect given by the model would indicate that 57 less individuals would 
choose to migrate if the level of income inequality at home increases.  
The two source countries have quite similar levels of income inequality: India’s score 
is 7.3 while Poland’s is 8.8.38 Even though the levels of income inequality are much the 
same we find, once we look into the marginal effects, that the amount of people from 
each are almost double for Poland than it is for India. In fact, an increase in the level of 
income inequality in India would lead to 765 less individuals returning, while an 
increase in the same variable in Poland would lead to almost twice as many people 
engaging in return migration. 
                                                          
37 The coefficient, in each specification, is zero to the third decimal place. 
 




This chapter has shown that two variables are more important than others in 
determining migration flows, to and from the country. The first of these variables is the 
cost of migration, which in this chapter has had distance. Another important variable, 
that helps to determine the size of flows from certain countries, is the gap in GDP 
between the two nations. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter applies the model developed by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) to data from 
the UK for the period from 29/04/01 until 27/04/11. The analysis required the 
construction of a new data set. This required combining a diverse range of other data 
sources including information from the 2011 UK census and information derived from 
the UK government’s Department for Work and Pensions. These two data sources were 
used to calculate the rate of return migration for the 93 countries that were studied. The 
construction of this data set also allows the potential to look into the average selection 
that decides the type of migrant that comes from different countries. 
I find that the two biggest factors that can affect outmigration rates, for different groups, 
are the distance between the source capital and London and the gap between the source 
and host countries GDP in 2011. I also calculate the marginal effects of each variable 
which has not been done before. 
 The marginal effects of an increase in distance was found to be 69239 more individuals 
returning home if the source was 1000 miles further away from the UK. There was a 
larger reaction to the narrowing of the gap in the two countries GDP. It was found that 
if the gap closed by 1% there would be an additional 1091 individuals returning to the 
source country. 
I also estimated the marginal effects of the change in variables for the two largest 
migrant cohorts in the UK over the time that has been selected for study. These 
countries are Poland and India. These two countries contradict many of the points from 
the initial paper by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). Distance from London, which was 
selected as a proxy for travel costs, to New Dehli is over 5,000 miles more than it is to 
Warsaw, and is therefore considered more expensive to travel to and from. Almost 
                                                          





twice as many people are going to travel between the capital of India (10,904) and 
London than would between the London and Warsaw (5,760).40 This would point to the 
opposite of the observation that was in the original paper, where the further away the 
source country is the fewer people will return.  
It could be, however, that in the 21st century and the decreases in transportation costs 
that have accompanied this, many of the migrants from countries close to the UK, 
mostly EU nations, may find it easier to return home for social and family events. While 
this is happening for the average Pole, the distance for the average Indian is much 
further, implying higher costs, and they may wait until they remigrate before engaging 
in social situations. 
Once we investigate the two countries differing reactions to a decrease in the gap 
between the GDP of host and source country it can be seen that similar reaction is being 
experienced by migrants of India and Poland. If there is a decrease in the GDP gap 
between India and the UK this is estimated to induce 17,204 more individuals to return 
to India. The same situation happening between the UK and Poland is estimated to lead 
to 9,087 more Poles returning back to their home country. 
 
  
                                                          











Is There Discrimination Against Migrants in the UK Labour Market? 















An investigation into gaps in the level of wages that are earned by different groups can 
give an indication that a labour market is exhibiting signs of discrimination against a 
particular group of individuals. I use an Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition in order 
to identify any gaps in the wages earned between workers who are native to the UK, 
and those who have migrated to the country. This will allow me to be able to separate 
those aspects that have a direct effect on wages and that part which can only be labelled 
as unexplained. 
In this chapter, I will provide a short literature review on the economics of 
discrimination and then review papers concerning the Oaxaca-Blinder wage 
decomposition. This technique allows me to identify reasons why there are differences 
in the average rate of pay that the two groups are remunerated for the labour that they 
provide. After differences in the levels of endowments have been accounted for I will 
be left with a gap that is unexplainable, which can also be interpreted as discrimination. 
Using this technique allows me to examine the gap in pay between UK native workers 
and migrant workers in the UK over the study period, 2001 until 2011, and will allow 
for an analysis in the changing nature of the pay gap between these two groups. This is 
pertinent in the context of the UK, as over this period there was two shocks to the stock 
of workers in the UK’s labour market. I find that the accession of the EU8 and the EU2 
had a significant effect upon where migrant workers fitted into the wage distribution in 
the UK.  
3.2 Literature Review 
This literature review is broken into two parts. The first part will look into a number of 
papers that describe discrimination within the labour market. It will then take an 
extensive look into the literature on the wage decomposition theory that was developed 
by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) as the basis for assessing the differences between 
the mean wages that are received by the two groups. 
3.2.1 A Short Review of the Literature on Discrimination 
Becker (1957) produced a book which examines the interaction between the discipline 
of economics and the practice of discrimination, based on one group being over or 
undervalued when it is compared to another group. It could be that members of one of 
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the groups do not want to work with any members of the other group. This will normally 
not be based on evidence about the discriminated against individuals of the other group. 
Becker proposed that white workers would have to be paid a premium relative to the 
black workforce in order to attract more white workers into the organisation, leading to 
a gap in wages and lower pay for the minority group. This does not require that both 
the employer and employee to discriminate against the group of black workers, only 
that one of the two have preference for not working with or employing this group or to 
have a “taste for discrimination” as Becker puts it in his book. He goes on to introduce 
a discrimination coefficient that is added to a wage rate, price charged by firms too and 
availability of products or services to the group that is discriminated against (in favour 
of) by employers, sellers and other economic interactions that these two groups have 
with each other, including co-workers of the non-discriminated against group. 
It could also be the case that employers are discriminating against one of the groups, 
and therefore discriminating in favour of the other. This makes the assumption that 
there are only two groups of workers. This is exactly what Becker does in his book by 
specifying that there are only white and black workers in the market. 
Becker indicates that there are a number of different reasons why one of the groups is 
being discriminated against. The first reason has to do with the sheer numbers in the 
minority group of workers, with larger numbers leading to an increase in 
discrimination. The other point has to do with the dispersion of the minority group in 
the host country. 
Becker theorised that the majority group will require an addition to their wage if they 
are being made to work with members of the minority group. It could also be the case 
that employers do not see workers from the minority group as having the same level of 
skills that the majority group has, this is not based on observation only a belief by those 
who are employing them. If it were the case that the members of the minority group 
had lower marginal productivities than the other group then employers would be 
justified paying them at a lower wage rate than members of the majority group, who 
are more productive. 
Arrow (1998) discusses racial discrimination in a more modern context. Even with the 
passing of the US Civil Rights Act (1964) it can still be considered that discrimination 
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based upon the colour of an individual’s skin still exists. This can be due to a number 
of reasons. 
It could be that individuals with black skin are discriminated against due to the size and 
influence of their social networks. Arrow notes that an individual’s beliefs and 
preferences, in a free society, are not governed by prices and markets. In a market 
subject to competitive pressures, discrimination should disappear. 
Due to the fact that social interactions are not expressed in a market atmosphere social 
discrimination may well persist. He argues that even with markets an individual’s 
beliefs will play a role in any transaction and that discrimination may well persist. 
3.2.2 A Selective Review of the Wage Decomposition Literature 
The literature on wage decomposition is fairly extensive. There are two papers that led 
to the introduction of the Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition technique and from 
where the technique’s name is derived. 
Oaxaca (1973) was one of the first to try to explain wage differentials between two well 
defined groups. This paper aims to estimate the gap in earnings between male a female 
full time wage earners in USA. It uses data from 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity 
in order to estimate wage gaps between male and female workers. Oaxaca found that 
there is no difference in pay among most types of jobs. The discrimination that can be 
observed is not that women were not paid the same as men for doing the same job, but 
rather that the type of work that they were involved in was quite different for the average 
female compared with the average man. 
The other central paper in this line of investigation is Blinder (1973). This paper centres 
more on wage disparities between the black and the white male populations in the USA 
as well as male and female populations and uses data from Michigan Survey Research 
Centre’s “Panel Study of Income Dynamics”. 
Blinder begins by examining the wage differential between white and black males. The 
author’s estimations show that whites earn, on average, 50.8% more than the black 
population. Most of this difference is due to the white population having larger returns 
to endowments.  On the other hand, the black sample gains more than the white by 
being a member of a trade union, seasonal employment and from tenure on the job. 
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The paper also presents a decomposition of the male-female wage differential. The 
author provides the reader with an equation for the following wage decomposition.  The 
female wage is estimated, by the author, to be 45.8% of the male wage. The largest 
single variable that favours males is estimated to be the return to age. Blinder points out 
that females have an almost flat wage-age profile while males display the standard 
convex profile as their age increases. Men also display larger coefficients than women 
for their return to education and dealing with local labour market conditions. The results 
show a very similar effect for the variable for local labour market conditions. 
Reimers (1983) seeks to investigate the earnings differential that is experience by US 
men of Hispanic or black origin. The author initially lists the wage differential of 
various Hispanic groups that are present in the US. The author does point to the fact 
that this could be a language issue. This is because the fluency rate of English is lower 
amongst all the categories of non-white Hispanic individuals than it is amongst the 
white population and the population of immigrants in general. The author also points 
to the possibility that this may not be aimed at Hispanics in general but against all 
groups of migrants who cannot speak the English language fluently. He also highlights 
that many immigrants, especially those from South America, have lower rates of human 
capital than the native population has. Both of these issues can be circumvented. The 
state could provide more education to the groups that are most affected by the disparity 
in educational attainment and help with assimilating migrants quicker than they 
currently are. This could be done, in part, by giving immigrants lessons in English 
lessons which should minimize the integration issues that many face upon arrival. 
In Neumark (1988) the author offers an alternative to the standard Oaxaca-Blinder wage 
decomposition technique. The author proposes that given the absence of discrimination 
(both positive and negative) in the labour market that the wages for both genders would 
be somewhere in between the current observed wages for males and that for females. 
However this non-discriminatory wage does not exist in reality and therefor needs to 
be estimated. He also shows how this model would also apply if there was 
discrimination that only worked in one direction for one of the groups41 and therefore 
one of the existing wage structures can be thought of as not exhibiting discrimination. 
                                                          
41 Much like in a lot of wage decomposition literature the examples used by the author are male/female differentials, but this 




Cotton (1988) disagrees with both Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). He argues that 
the techniques developed by both authors fail to regard that for a single population, 
composed of various groups, discrimination can work in both directions. It may be the 
case that one group within the population is more favoured by the labour market. The 
author then sets out a slightly different way in which the wage decomposition can be 
done. If a non-discriminatory set of coefficients can be estimated then the wage 
decomposition can proceed as normal. However, when the difference in coefficients is 
to be estimated the process is slightly more complicated. Instead of the estimation of 
differentials in coefficients just being those coefficients estimated for the majority 
group minus that same coefficient for the minority group as we now have a non-
discriminatory coefficient.42 This changes the calculation of the wage decomposition. 
Firstly, the non-discriminatory wage has to be taken away from the majority group, and 
then the minority coefficient is subtracted from the non-discriminatory coefficient. In 
the paper the author shows the benefit of being a majority worker combined with the 
cost of being a minority worker. 
Differing occupational distributions are, at least partly, responsible for wage inequality 
between two groups, and this is investigated by Brown et al. (1980). In this paper the 
authors attempt to correct for any bias that may be introduced into the Oaxaca-Blinder 
wage decomposition arising from differences in the distribution of occupation between 
the two genders. In order to alleviate the bias that this may introduce the authors run a 
multinomial logit model on the male population and then apply the results to the female 
population. Differences in the proportions in work in each population and the 
hypothetical distribution that would result from women being employed on the same 
basis as men are added to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The results that are found 
lead the authors to suggest that most of the gender gap in wages may be due to the 
occupational difference that are observed between the two genders. They find that if 
women were employed in a similar way to the way that men are employed there would 
be many more females in managerial positions and less doing more clerical 
occupations. 
Miller (1987) attempts to replicate the technique used in Brown et al., but this paper 
focuses on the UK rather than the US. His paper follows the same process as that of 
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Brown et al. in that the first stage is to estimate a counterfactual distribution for females 
across occupations, but Miller uses a multinomial probit model to estimate the 
probability of how many women in the sample would be in different jobs compared to 
the current distribution. As in Brown et al., Miller found that it was not inter-
occupational differences that drove the discrepancy in pay between the two genders. 
The differential in pay he found was more the cause of intra-occupational difference in 
pay rates. The unjustifiable difference in pay rates that is not down solely to differences 
in socio economic variable between the two groups is more down to the fact that women 
are less likely to be promoted in their company than a comparable man is. 
Polavieja (2004) investigates, as others have also done, how the type of job that is 
generally occupied by females may be a factor that is driving the wage gap between the 
genders. He proposes that the division in distributions of “task specificity”43 jobs are 
that the higher degree of task specificity that is required by certain jobs will generally 
lead to that occupation receiving higher wages than jobs that only have low specificity. 
It is argued by the author that the inclusion of a variable that defines the specificity of 
the tasks involved in a certain job could be a useful addition to the Oaxaca-Blinder 
wage decomposition methodology.  
Some jobs may be friendlier to those who may take extended periods of time out of the 
labour market.44 The author checks this against a model developed by Goldthorpe 
(2001). In this model two jobs are proposed. Job A has initially a lower wage than job 
B, but this is quickly exceeded by the return to tenure related pay increases due to the 
specificity of the job. Job B, as mentioned above, starts with a higher rate of pay than 
job A. However job B has a much flatter curve when describing the returns to 
experience. 
This point was explored in the early work of Mincer and Polachek (1974). In this paper 
the authors aim to explain reasons why women, on average, earn less than a male over 
their working life. This paper proposes that female earnings are less than an equivalent 
man due to females engaging in more time spent not participating in the labour market. 
The authors propose three different life cycles engaged in by the average working 
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woman. If the female does not marry and does not have kids then women engaging in 
this form of working life should see a progression similar to that experienced by men. 
If the female does have kids then she, after the birth of the first child, may leave the 
labour force entirely and not return until after the children have gotten to school age. 
For those engaging in labour market participation of this kind Another possibility that 
may present itself is that the women has a break between child bearing and the children 
attending school. These individuals would generally be assumed to return to the work 
force after their children have started school. This would imply a double peak in 
earnings for anyone who does engage in this pattern of working over their life-cycle. 
The authors do admit that the period between child birth and the children going to 
school may be a period where the skills that the woman has accumulated over her life 
may depreciate. 
Suh (2009) sets out to investigate, and decompose, the change in the inequality between 
male and female wages. The author runs an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on both 
1989 and 2005 and then decomposes the changes over that period. The author uses the 
adaptation of the decomposition technique that was developed by Neumark (1988). The 
comparison between the 2 years show that in a number of the variables that would be 
counted as components for human capital the gap that was exhibited between males and 
females has narrowed or that women have even overtaken the average of those variables 
relative to men. This is especially noticeable in the length of time that the two groups 
spend in education. Even though the author has showed a narrowing of the gender wage 
gap he does concede that women, no matter which gender is used as reference, still earn 
roughly 80% of the equivalent male. 
The difference between the earnings of natives and immigrants in Malaysia is examined 
by Annees et al. (2011). In Malaysia migrants into Malaysia have, on average, higher 
levels of Human Capital variables than native workers do.45 Even with higher amounts 
of human capital, immigrant workers to Malaysia earn less than the average native 
Malaysian. Migrants will normally select themselves into a job in the manufacturing 
industry whereas the native wages tend more the select a job in the service sector. The 
average level of wages is higher in the services sector than it is in manufacturing 
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industries than they are in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. They also highlight that 
there is a regional aspect to where the migrants have a tendency to be based. 
Differentials between regions could also explain some of the earnings differential 
between the two groups. The author then concludes that there is a degree of 
discrimination46 leading to the difference in the average earnings between the two 
groups. 
Bitilagy (2014) uses the Neumark-Oaxaca version of an Oaxaca-Blinder wage 
decomposition in order to attempt to explain the gender wage gap in Egypt over the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s. Like many other studies, the author investigates if there is a 
gender wage gap in Egypt and, if there is, to attempt to explain why such a gap that the 
different genders are paid, on average exists. 
One of the biggest problems that can occur when using the Oaxaca-Blinder technique 
is the identification issue that can occur when the regressions of the group specific wage 
equations contain dummy variables. Yun (2005) offers a potential solution to the 
problem. The author suggests estimating the wage equation using each possible value 
of the various dummy variables as the reference group. He demonstrates with an 
example using a set of dummy variables that will lead to varying coefficients for the 
different variables given that the reference group is changed. In the example in the paper 
he has three dummy variables. He shows the ramifications of using various categories 
as the reference point for the dummy variables and that the other variables coefficients 
are in reference to the variable that has been left out. He shows that the easiest way that 
this can be done is by estimating the wage equation using various categories as the 
reference variable. After this has been done, Yun suggests that for each category the 
easiest way to estimate the overall coefficient is to take the estimated coefficients that 
are generated and then take the average of these number of values generated.47 In the 
simple example that he shows in the paper it is simply adding three numbers, one of 
which is zero, and taking the average. 
3.3 EU expansion and wage discrimination between migrants and natives 
in the UK  
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groups. 
47 Obviously the one where this category is the reference group will be equal to 0 
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I now turn to the analysis of the differences between migrants and native wages in the 
UK using the wage decomposition techniques developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973). I will focus, in particular, on the period between the censuses of 2001 and 2011.  
This period is particularly interesting because of the large increase in migration to the 
UK as a result of the expansion of the EU and the extension of freedom of movement 
to workers from the new member states (NMS hereafter). 
The EU8 are eight of the ten nations that joined the EU on 01/05/04 and since then have 
had free access to the UK labour and goods markets: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary (the remaining two are Cyprus and 
Malta). The EU2 are Romania and Bulgaria who both joined the EU on 01/01/07.  Since 
the accession of the EU8 and EU2 there has been a significant increase in migrant 
labour residing in the UK and therefore to the overall labour force. In 2004 the UK 
government was one of only three countries, along with Sweden and the Republic of 
Ireland, to allow free access to individuals residing within the new member states free 
access to their domestic labour markets (Longhi and Rokicka 2012). This however this 
was not repeated with the two states that joined in 2007. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on data drawn from three individual years – 2001, 2006 
and 2011. The reason that these years were chosen is due to the accession of the new EU 
member states into the union. The reason that 2001 was chosen was due to the fact that this 
year predated any accession of the Eastern European states into the EU and therefore was able 
to provide a year showing the results of Ordinary Least Squares regression and the two different 
wage decompositions without any influence from the accession of the NMS. The reason 2006 
was chosen was due to the fact that the EU8 had joined the EU on 1/5/04 and so had had 18 
months to settle into the United Kingdom and find work. The final year that was chosen for this 
study was 2011. The reason for this is that all of the new member states had joined and the 
transitional arrangements had finished by January 2011, at least for the EU8. This meant that 
the EU8 and EU2 and the island of Malta and the whole island of Cyprus48 were now members 
of the EU.  
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for natives and migrants, separately, in the UK 
for the years 2001, 2006 and 2011 based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS); the 
data source is discussed further below. Upon inspection of Table 3.1a, it can be seen 
                                                          




that migrants, on average, have higher levels of education and are more likely to be 
married than an average individual in the native population. However the native 
population, apart from in 2001, has a higher average wage than the group of migrants. 
Basic economic theory suggests that an increase in supply would normally lead to a 
decrease in the price of that good. This would suggest that a significant increase in the 
amount of migrant labour to a market would push down the wage in the occupations 
that migrants tend to get employment in.49 This is discussed in Ruhs and Vargas-Silva 
(2015) in their report for the Migration Observatory, although the authors do highlight 
that this gap has more to do with the specific sectors that the migrants tend to be 
employed in and that even though it is significant the reduction in wages is not 
particularly large. 
By running an Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition I can investigate how much of this 
wage differential is down to discrimination against migrants simply for being migrants 
and not being a native to the UK. This discrimination could simply be because they are 
migrants, or because migrants share some common and undesirable trait such as the 
inability to speak English as well as a native individual. 
The Oaxaca-Blinder wage decomposition is widely used to investigate why one group 
of workers is paid more or less than another group. The technique is normally done as 
a two-fold decomposition, where the differences are cut down to those differences that 
can be explained by differences in the two groups endowments of the covariates that 
have a direct effect on the wages of an individual and unexplained portion, which is 
shown by the differences in the estimated coefficients. A threefold version of the wage 
decomposition also includes an interaction term that assesses both the gap in 
endowments multiplied by the gap in coefficients as these two items move together and 
not in isolation. 
In this chapter’s threefold decomposition analysis there is an extra step that looks to 
further decompose the part of the twofold decomposition that falls into the explained 
category. An inspection of the twofold and the threefold tables shows that the 
“Unexplained” section is exactly equal to the coefficients section of the threefold 
decomposition. The reason behind this can be seen from an examination of the 
equations for the two various decompositions. As can be seen from equation (7) there 
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is a bit more to the usual twofold decomposition as there is now the non-discriminated 
set of coefficients contained in the vector β*. In this analysis I have decided that the 
best non-discriminatory coefficients should be those for the native group. This changes 
the analysis slightly. The part of equation (7) on the far right hand side, everything 
within the square brackets changes once the analysis is done the way I have decided on 
using. By inspection it can be seen that the first part within the square brackets contains 
the term (βn-β*). However, by assumption, we know that those two terms are equal to 
each other and therefore that part of the equation is  equal to 0. We now only have the 
term on the far right hand side, which we can see after a quick inspection of equation 
(9) is exactly the same. This allows me to further decompose the explained section of a 
twofold decomposition into that part that is down to the different endowments between 
the two groups and the interaction terms. 
The analysis is done using the Stata statistical package and the Stata command “oaxaca” 
by Jann (2008).  Details of this Stata command are presented in Jann (2008). As well 
as discussing the Stata command, the paper also discusses how the command produces 
either two-way or three-way decompositions. In a three-way decomposition, besides 
the endowment differential and the difference in coefficients between the two groups, 
there is also an interaction between the endowments and coefficients. 
3.4 Data 
The data for this study comes from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS hereafter). The 
LFS is a survey aimed to be a representative survey of all private households within the 
UK. A wide range of data is collected for the LFS, including questions on earnings and 
the national origin of individuals. The LFS is a quarterly rotating panel survey of 
approximately 40,000 households.50 Each household is interviewed in five consecutive 
quarters. Each household consists of one or more individuals, only some of whom may 
be working. The information collected makes it possible to compare earnings of native 
and migrant individual residents of the UK, taking into account individual 
characteristics such as age and education.  
The three panels of Table 3.1 show the descriptive statistics for various dimensions of 
the populations under study. Table 3.1a shows the descriptive statistics for the overall 
population. Tables 3.1b and 3.1c have descriptive statistics for the subsets of men and 
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women. These tables show a number of interesting features. For the total sample, the 
average wage for migrants is initially well above that for natives in 2001. By 2006 the 
gap has almost disappeared, and by 2011 migrants have a substantially lower wage 
when they are compared with the native cohort.  The patter is similar for men and 
women taken separately, except that native men have already overtaken migrant men 
by 2006, whereas native women overtake migrant women only by 2008. 
It can be seen from these tables that the two populations have a number of differences 
in their endowments of human capital. The migrant population is younger than the 
native population. The various tables show that the normal age difference between the 
native and migrant population starts at about 2 years in 2001. The difference in the 
average age between the two groups grows throughout the sample period with the 
results shown in Table 1a showing and age difference of 2.13 years in 2001 compared 
with a gap of 5.67 years by 2011. 
Another measure in which the two populations differ is the amount of years of education 
that have been completed. The migrant cohort always has a higher amount of education 
than the native cohort does; for example, 2.37 more years of education for women in 
2001 to 1.85 years of difference in the 2001 male cohort. 
It can also be seen from these tables that the average migrant has, on average, more 
than two years greater work experience than the equivalent native worker. This applies 




Figure 3.1 – Wages of both Migrants and Natives  
 
Source: Figure from http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/characteristics-and-outcomes-




Table 3.2 shows the type of job that the migrant population ends up working in. By 
2006 there is a sharp rise in the migrants population who work in the “Elementary” 
occupations. This carries on into the final year that is sampled, 2011, with a further rise 
in the proportion of the migrant population involved in “Elementary” occupations. 
Analysis by CEPS shows that most migrants, from the EU and beyond, are on average 
younger and better educated than the UK domestic population taken as a whole, as is 
the case in the LFS samples used in this study. 
This study focuses on the hourly pay that each individual receives from working in their 
main job.51 Respondents to the survey provide data on earnings in two of the five 
consecutive quarters, the first and the fifth quarters in which the individual is surveyed 
in. In this study I will only be using the responses from the earnings question in the first 
quarter in which any individual was surveyed. This is partly to address the potential 
bias that results from attrition; it could be that the household does not reply beyond a 
certain number of waves for various reasons. 
In order to estimate the Mincer-type wage equations that are used for the wage 
decomposition, we require variables for wages, education, experience and an indicator 
of whether the individual is a native or a migrant to the UK. I also use indicators for 
gender and marital status. Several of these variables had to be derived from the data 
that is provided in the LFS. 
A rate of pay that would be consistent across all individuals had to be derived. An 
important reason for this is that the LFS reports total earnings in a period irrespective 
of whether the person is employed full-time or part-time. It is also necessary because 
earnings in the survey are reported variously as yearly, monthly or weekly pay rates. 
Rates of hourly pay were derived by taking the total weekly pay that an individual is 
paid per week and dividing this number by the total number of hours that the same 
individual works in an average week. 
The variable that is used for education requires a small computation in order to convert 
the given data into a form that is to be used in this study. The data that is reported by 
the LFS is simply when an individual leaves full time education. In order to derive the 
amount of years that an individual has spent in full time education I have taken the 
                                                          




reported age at which they finished their full-time education and subtract 5 from this, 
as this is the age when most children will have started their schooling in the UK.52 
Two different variables are used to cover the experience that an individual has 
accumulated in their working life. The first is the tenure that they have accumulated in 
their current job. The second is the amount of potential work experience over their 
working life before their current job. As is standard in the literature, the variable used 
to measure an individual’s potential level of experience is their current age minus the 
age at which they completed their education. It is also standard to include in Mincer-
type wage equations the square of experience as an explanatory variable. Experience-
earnings profiles (or age-earnings profiles) typically have an inverse U-shaped curve 
For the purposes of this chapter, anyone who reports in the LFS that they came from a 
foreign nation, i.e. a nation outside of the UK, is considered a “migrant” to the UK. A 
“native” is someone who reports themself to be British or to come from any of the 
individual nations that comprise the UK, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, as being their nationality. 
3.5 Methodology 
This chapter will largely follow the methodology as described by Jann (2008). Firstly, 
we identify two different groups. Natives and migrants are the two groups of interest 
for this study. The task is to investigate the source of the difference in the dependent 
variable, the log of hourly wages. The log of hourly wages of individual i in group g is 
ln(wgi). We specify and estimate, separately, a wage equation for each group of the form 
ln(𝑤𝑔𝑖) = 𝑋𝑔𝑖
′ 𝛽𝑔 + 𝜀𝑔𝑖        (3) 
The explanatory variables are Xgi with coefficients βg and εgi is the error term.  
As by assumption E(εgi)=0 and βg is a constant, 
𝐸(ln(𝑤𝑔𝑖)) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑔𝑖)𝛽𝑔        (4) 
                                                          





We write the log of hourly wages of an individual in the native group as ln(wNi), and 
similarly for an individual in the migrant group as ln(wMi). Then the average difference, 
R, in the log hourly wages is 
𝑅 = 𝐸(ln(𝑤𝑁𝑖)) − 𝐸(ln(𝑤𝑀𝑖))       (5) 
After the two regressions required have been estimated we can then use (5) to 
decompose the difference in the rates of pay, and its determinants, experienced by the 
two groups. The estimated difference in the log hourly wage rates is based on the 
difference in sample means: 
?̅? = ln (𝑤𝑁)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − ln (𝑤𝑀)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        (5’) 
where E(ln(wNi)) is estimated by ln (𝑤𝑁)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, the average log hourly wage for natives in the 
LFS data, and for migrants E(ln(wMi)) is estimated by ln (𝑤𝑀)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
Equation (4), for the two groups, is now substituted into equation (5), giving us equation 
(6). This enables us to decompose the differences in pay into differences between the 
two groups’ average endowments of socioeconomic attributes (education, experience, 
gender, etc.) and into how a countries labour market rewards these two groups 
differently, or a coefficient effect. In both Oaxaca and Blinder the differences in the βs, 
i.e. the intercepts and the various coefficients under study, can be thought of as 
reflecting differences in the unobserved characteristics displayed by the two groups. 
𝑅 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ )𝛽𝑁 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ )𝛽𝑀        (6) 
This can be estimated using sample averages for the endowments and the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimates ?̂? for the coefficients: 
?̅? = ?̅?𝑁
′ ?̂?𝑁 − ?̅?𝑀
′ ?̂?𝑀         (6’) 
This shows the two contributing factors to the gap in wages displayed by the two 
groups. Equation (6) can be rearranged to decompose the wage gap into the contribution 
of endowments of socioeconomic variables and the returns to those variables. The wage 
decomposition can be calculated in one of two ways, both of which will be presented 




The twofold decomposition is a good technique to use when a researcher suspects only 
one group suffers from discrimination. It could also be the case that one group is 
discriminated against in a negative fashion and the other receives no positive 
discrimination or that there is only positive discrimination and no one suffers from 
negative discrimination. This is appropriate in the application here, because it can be 
reasonable to treat natives as not facing any discrimination. 
The twofold decomposition requires us to define β* which represents the coefficients 
that would hold if there was no discrimination in either a positive or a negative 
direction. Then we can rewrite equation (6) as: 
𝑅 = (𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ ))𝛽∗ + [𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ )(𝛽𝑁 − 𝛽
∗) + 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ )(𝛽∗ − 𝛽𝑀)]  (7) 
Equation (7) shows the equation that is used in a twofold decomposition. The difference 
in the endowments between the two groups in the twofold decomposition is known as 
the “explained component”. 
As can be seen above the difference in the estimates in the gap in endowments are 
weighted be the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage equation coefficients included 
in the vector 𝛽∗. When we are looking into the gap in coefficients we need to weight 
them separately, using the individual group average endowments, depending on what 
part of the gap in coefficients that we are investigating. It is expected that in a labour 
market that has discrimination, or the over-valuing and/or under-valuing of unobserved 
characteristics, one of the groups, normally the majority group or in the context of this 
chapter the group of natives, will be paid more than the neutral group (with coefficients 
𝛽∗) which would, in turn, be paid more than the minority group, or migrants in this 
chapter. It could also be the case that only one of the groups suffers from discrimination 
and the other group suffers from none. Here we will assume that the natives do not 
suffer the same kind of discrimination as do the group of migrants. We therefore set 
𝛽∗ = 𝛽𝑁 and obtain equation (8): 
𝑅 = (𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ ))𝛽𝑁 + [𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ )(𝛽𝑁 − 𝛽𝑀)]     (8) 
We are only interested in the difference between the migrant wage structure and that 
experienced by the group that suffers from no discrimination, which by assumption in 




It is also relatively simple to calculate a threefold wage decomposition. This is done by 
rewriting equation (6) as equation (9) below. The main difference between the twofold 
decompositions in equations (7) and (8) and the threefold decomposition in equation 
(9) is the fact that equation (9), as well as calculating the gap in endowments and 
coefficients also calculates the interaction between the gap in endowments and the gap 
in the estimated coefficients as they both move at the same time. 
𝑅 = (𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ ))𝛽𝑀 + 𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ )(𝛽𝑁 − 𝛽𝑀) + [𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑀𝑖
′ )](𝛽𝑁 − 𝛽𝑀)
           (9) 
Equation (9) allows the reader to investigate the different aspects of the threefold wage 
decomposition. The three parts on the right hand side of (9) are the difference in the 
two group’s average level of endowments and the coefficients in the separate wage 
equations for the groups and the interactions between the gaps for average endowments 
multiplied by the gap between the two groups estimated coefficients. It makes sense 
that the coefficient effect part is included in equation (9) as that can be used to describe 
if there is any discrimination in the labour market, 𝐸(𝑋𝑁𝑖
′ )(𝛽𝑁 − 𝛽𝑀). This part does 
not just include the difference in the estimated coefficients for the two groups but also 
the difference in the estimated intercepts that I estimated in the OLS regressions of the 
individual groups’ wage equations. 
If there are differences in the average observable productivity between the two groups 
then the reason for the difference is down to the vectors of XN and XM. In Becker (1962) 
it is argued that the development of human capital occurs throughout the working life 
of an individual. If UK society had no discrimination present in its labour market then 
the differences in the wage rates between the two groups would be down to the two 
groups’ average level of socio-economic characteristics, their productivity. The 
differences in the marginal productivities of the two groups would explain why there 
are differences in the wage rates, on average, between the two. However, some 
employers may pay lower wages to migrants for various reasons: migrants may not 
have all of the skills that are required by the company, said employers may prefer 
natives for some reason or the employers may simply discriminate against migrants. 
In the twofold decomposition, as in Tables 3.5, 3.8 and 3.11, the top panel gives the 




assessed. Below this appears the difference between the two groups and then the parts 
of that difference that fall into the categories of explained, the overall endowment 
effect, and the part of the gap in the log wage that is unexplained. It is gaps in the 
unexplained part that could be considered as discrimination. 
Below this top panel there are two more panels. In these panels the individual variables 
are then assessed for their gaps in endowments and coefficients that allows for the 
second panel to be concerned about the explained gaps, gaps in the endowments, and 
then the third and final panel that breaks the unexplained part down for each individual 
variable. The intercept term is included in the unexplained part. 
The threefold decomposition tables, Tables 3.6, 3.9 and 3.12, are structured in a very 
similar way to the twofold decomposition. In the top panel appears the average log 
hourly wages for the two groups, and the difference between these two averages is 
presented in the first three lines of these tables. After this, besides the breakdowns for 
the endowment and coefficient effect, now just called endowments and coefficients, 
there is a third component. This third part of the decomposition is labelled the 
interaction effect. 
There are now four panels beneath this top section. Each of these describes the three 
effects for the individual variables. Much like in the twofold decomposition, these three 
panels break the overall effects into the effects of the individual variables. 
3.6 Results 
The results in this section are divided into three sections that are then each divided into 
four subsections. The first section will discuss the results for all migrants and all natives 
in the years 2001, 2006 and 2011. I will first discuss the results of the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates. I will then move onto the twofold decomposition for each of 
the two groups in each of the three years that are being studied. Then I discuss the 
corresponding results for the threefold decomposition. After the results for the 
decompositions have been reviewed, I then move onto a set of counterfactual estimates 
for the log per hourly wage. The counterfactual considered is for the migrant group to 
keep their initial endowments but to be rewarded for these endowments as the native 
population is and also the native population’s endowments with the returns that the 




This is then repeated twice for the groups of subpopulations. The first of the 
subpopulations will be male-only groupings of natives and migrants. All four of the 
different processes will be performed again for the groupings of men. Then I consider 
the female subpopulations of the overall groups. 
A complete set of twofold decompositions of all eleven years between 2001 and 2011 
appears in the Appendix to this chapter. 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 All migrants vs. all Natives 
3.6.1.1 OLS results 
The results from the estimation of the standard OLS wage equations are given in Table 
3.4. As can be seen from a quick examination of the table, coefficient estimates for the 
group of natives are precisely estimated, and statistically significantly different from 
zero with p-values of 0.001 or smaller. The estimates for the group of migrants are less 
precisely determined, which is not surprising given the small numbers of migrants in 
the sample relative to the numbers of natives.  The two variables for the migrant sample 
that are consistently different from zero at the 0.1% level are years spent in education 
and their tenure on the current job. 
The return to education is consistently higher for natives than it is for migrants over the 
period being investigated. The estimated return to education falls slightly over the 
period for natives, but first increases and then decreases for migrants. By contrast, an 
individual’s return to tenure in the current job in which they are employed in is higher 
for migrants than it is for natives, especially in the later years of the period being 
studied. A potential reason for this pattern could be due to the length of time since the 
initial migration, which is decreasing over the sample period. 
3.6.1.2 Twofold Decomposition Results 
Table 3.5 shows the results of the twofold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The reported 
gaps are all weighted gaps in the endowments and the coefficients.53 The mean hourly 
wage initially favours the migrant cohort that is present in 2001 by 8.3% (a negative 
difference indicates a gap in favour of the migrant group). These numbers change so 
                                                          




that by 2006 migrants earn approximately the same amount as natives; the log 
percentage difference is 1.4%, in favour of natives, but is not significantly different 
from zero. By 2011 it is the group of natives who are now earning a higher amount by 
5.9% in log terms, on average, than the group of migrants. 
We next look into the individual components of the decomposition. Table 3.5 shows 
that the 2001 difference in the explained, or endowment, part is equal to a gap of 0.14 
or a log difference of 14% in favour of the migrant cohort. Most of the endowments of 
the variables in the explained portion contribute in favour of migrants; the exceptions 
are tenure in the current job,54 married status and experience (which make contributions 
that are insignificantly different from zero, the latter when the effects of experience and 
it square are combined). The biggest gap, in favour of the migrant group is for education 
with a gap of 0.154, so that education is providing 15% difference in log terms to the 
gap in earnings between the native and migrant group and does so in the favour of the 
migrant cohort.  
Once the unexplained, or coefficient, gap contributions for 2001 are examined it can be 
seen that the contributions are not very precisely determined and most components are 
not significantly different from zero. Only the contribution of the differences in the 
return to education is statistically significantly different from zero and only at the 5% 
level. This contribution is 0.322, so that natives have a higher return to education and 
this provides a wage advantage of just over 30%, but this is not precisely estimated with 
the standard error for this variable in 2001 being equal to 0.143. 
The results for the 2006 decomposition are reported in the third column of Table 3.5. 
As has been mentioned above, the wage gap for 2006 is now slightly in favour of the 
native cohort, relative to the migrant cohort. The natives are now earning 1.958 log 
points, or £7.09, versus the migrant cohort’s average earnings of 1.944 log points, or 
£6.99. Overall migrants are now earning slightly less on average than the native group 
by £0.10 per hour although this gap is not statistically significant. 
The part of the decomposition that considered as explained by the difference in 
endowments has fallen in the period between 2001 and 2006 from -0.142 to -0.130 with 
both being in the favour of the migrant cohort. The unexplained part of the 
                                                          




decomposition has also changed in the same direction as the explained part of the 
decomposition, but the change is much larger for the unexplained part than it is for the 
explained part. The change in the contribution to the native-migrant wage gap of 
changes in the endowments is 0.007 log points in favour of the natives (from -0.142 
to -0.130), whereas the contribution of changes in coefficients is 0.084 log points (from 
+0.060 to +0.144).  
If we examine the explained component it can be seen that the advantage that the 
migrant cohort has in education has decreased slightly by 0.009 log points, from -0.154 
to -0.145. Much like in 2001, only the endowment of education in the explained section 
of the decomposition favours the group of migrants. The key characteristic in the 
explained section that favours the native group is tenure. When examining this variable 
and referring to Tables 3.1a it is clear that migrants are younger than the native 
population, and a large part in 2006 derive from Eastern Europe, the so-called EU8, 
countries that had only just joined the EU; therefore the majority of these migrants are 
new to the country. These new migrants can be expected on average to have fewer years 
in their current job than the cohort of migrants in place in 2001. Much like in the results 
of the decomposition for 2001, the total contribution of experience is not statistically 
different from zero, nor is marital status, but gender contributes about 0.01 log points 
in favour of migrants. 
With respect to the contribution of the unexplained part of the decomposition one of 
the biggest variables that contributes in the favour of natives is the return to education. 
However, although the contribution of this variable is large (+0.0923 log points), it is 
imprecisely estimated: the standard error is 0.088, and the contribution is not 
significantly different from zero. By contrast the return to tenure is also large in absolute 
terms (-0.056 log points) and is estimated with more precision than the return to 
education, with the standard error for tenure in 2006 being -0.01. 
The results for 2011 reflect a continuation of this trend with natives still having higher 
earnings relative to migrants. In 2011 the log average wages for natives and migrants 
are 2.097 and 2.037 log points respectively. The gap in wages earned by the two groups 
has increased to 0.0593 log points. This gap is estimated precisely, with a standard error 




In the decomposition for 2011 results for the explained section once again, as in 2001 
and 2006, the migrants have a greater amount of education when they are surveyed. 
However, the total contribution of the education endowments to the wage gap in 2011 
has not changed much from either the levels estimated in 2006 or 2001 (-0.152 log 
points in 2011, -0.149 in 2006 and -0.154 in 2001). The contribution of tenure in the 
job has moved slightly further in favour of natives, from +0.0332 in 2006 to +0.0439 
in 2011. As in 2006, the contribution of endowments for both education and tenure are 
precisely estimated, with small standard errors. The contribution of tenure in 2011 to 
the unexplained portion is about the same as in 2006, at -0.0547 log points. The biggest 
change between 2006 and 2011 in terms of the unexplained effect is for the return to 
education. The 2011 estimated returns to education now favours the natives so that the 
contribution to the gap is 0.256 log points, compared to a contribution in 2006 that is 
not statistically significantly different from zero. 
The complete set of annual twofold decompositions in the Appendix confirms these 
patterns.  Between 2001 and 2011, the overall wage gap moves steadily from being in 
favour of migrants to being in favour of natives.  The explained component – reflecting 
differences in the endowments of the two groups – is relatively steady over the full 
period, falling only slightly from about 13-15% in favour of migrants in the early part 
of the period, to about 11-12% by the end of the period. The unexplained component – 
reflecting differences in coefficients – starts in favour of natives by about 6-7% at the 
start of the period, and rises steadily to about 17-20% by the end of the period. Within 
the explained or endowments contribution, the educational endowment contribution in 
favour of migrants is steady throughout the period at about 15-17%, whereas the tenure 
endowment in favour of natives slowly increases from under 3% to around 4%. This 
reflects the influx of migrants; who are new arrivals and have spent less time in the 
country and hence in the host countries labour market. The patterns over time in the 
unexplained, or coefficient, contributions are also largely driven by education and 
tenure. The return to education in the early part of the period favours natives but is not 
precisely determined; by the middle of the period, it is insignificantly different from 
zero before a return to contributing in favour of native group. The return to tenure, by 
contrast, shows the interesting pattern discussed above.  In the early part of the period, 




tenure, but this changes steadily over the period to a substantial and precisely 
determined contribution in favour of migrants of about 4-6% by the end of the period. 
 
3.6.1.3 Threefold Decomposition Results 
The results of the threefold decomposition are presented in Table 3.6. As was covered 
in the methodology section the tables for the threefold decomposition are laid out 
slightly differently to the twofold decomposition. As with the twofold decomposition 
results, the gaps in endowments and coefficients are weighted gaps. The estimated 
wages follow the same pattern as they did in the twofold decomposition – the overall 
wages for natives and migrants and the gap between the two is the same by definition 
as in Table 3.5 for the twofold decomposition – but there is now an additional effect, 
the interaction effect, and the size of the endowment effect has altered. However due to 
the way that this is calculated the coefficient effect is identical to that estimated in the 
twofold decomposition.55 
Much like in the twofold decompositions, the migrant cohort outperform the native 
group in terms of the endowment of education by 0.105 log points, or 10.5%, in 2001. 
This is repeated in 2006 and 2011 (the contributions of education are -0.131 in 2006 
and -0.109 in 2011). All of the estimated gaps in education are significantly different 
from zero at the 0.1% level. By contrast, tenure in the current job in which an individual 
is employed favours natives in all three years. The size of this gap is 0.0302 in 2001, 
0.0950 in 2006 and reaches 0.103 in 2011. These gaps are all positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero, and therefore favour the native cohort in the gap in 
hourly pay. 
Next, we move on to the gap in the estimated coefficients for the two groups. Like in 
the twofold decomposition presented earlier, the number of gaps that are significantly 
different from no gap at all is less than those for the endowments between the two 
populations. Only four of the estimated coefficient gaps are significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level or less: two for the returns to education and two for the returns to 
tenure. The significant gaps for education appear in 2001 and then again in 2011. The 
first of these gaps, which is equal to 0.322 return to education in 2001, is precisely 
                                                          




estimated but is only significant at the 5% level. The second of these gaps is estimated 
with more precision at 0.256 and is significant at the higher 1% level. Both of these 
gaps, and the imprecisely estimated gap in the return to education in 2006, which is 
estimated to be 0.0923, favour the native population over the migrant one. 
In addition to these gaps, the threefold decomposition, as discussed in the methodology 
section of this chapter, includes the effects of the gap in the interaction between the 
gaps in the native/migrant endowments of the various variables and the gaps in the 
estimated coefficients. In all three of the selected year’s gaps in the interaction between 
coefficients and endowments favours the migrant population. The most statistically 
significant interaction gaps in this section mirror, to an extent, the most significant 
variables from the gap in the estimated coefficients. Rather unsurprisingly, it is once 
again the gap in the interaction for education in 2001 and 2011 and the gap in tenure in 
both 2006 and 2011 that are the only significant gaps in the threefold decomposition. 
All of the significant gaps in the interaction part of the decomposition reflect, even to 
the same levels of significance, the gaps that are produced in the coefficients section of 
the decomposition. The interaction between the gap in endowment and the gap in the 
estimated coefficients in education is equal to -0.0487 and is only statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The other gap which is statistically significant, at the 5% 
level, is the interaction for education for the 2011 estimate and is equal to -0.0427, 
which is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. The other two gaps that are 
significant are for tenure in 2006 and 2011 that are estimated to be equal to -0.0618 in 
2006 and -0.0593 for 2011. 
3.6.1.4 Counterfactuals 
Table 3.13 shows sets of counterfactual predictions of what the various populations 
would earn if they had the coefficients that have been estimated for the other group. For 
instance, if the migrant group had the same coefficients that were estimated for the 
native group, but the same level of endowments as they have as presented in Table 3.1. 
The first row in Table 13 shows what the outcome would be if the group of migrants, 
overall, had the coefficients that are estimated for the group of natives in each of the 
three years being studied. By comparing the results from Table 3.13 to those found in 
Table 3.5, it can be seen that the overall group of migrants would be earning 1.88 log 




on average. This shows that in 2001 that migrants were being paid less than they would 
have been if they had the same returns as the native cohort does. This is continued 
throughout the period of study, with the prediction for the amount that would be earned 
by the migrant group being 2.07 (£7.92) in 2006 and 2.19 (£8.94) in 2011. 
Counterfactuals were also calculated for the group of natives if they were rewarded as 
the group of migrants are for their level of skills. The counterfactual for the native group 
in 2001 is 1.77 log points (£5.87). This continues throughout the study period with an 
estimated counterfactual of 1.93 (£6.88) in 2006 and 2.04 (£7.69) for 2011. 
The counterfactuals show an interesting story in this study. The average earnings for 
the migrant group would be substantially higher, apart from in 2001 when it is only 
marginally higher, if their endowments were rewarded on the same basis as those of 
natives. 
3.6.2 Male Decompositions 
In this section the results of the Ordinary Least Squares estimates and the twofold and 
threefold decompositions for male natives and migrants are presented in Tables 3.7, 3.8 
and 3.9 respectively. 
    3.6.2.1 OLS Results 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the OLS estimates for male natives and male migrants 
over three years in the sample period. For the male-only samples there are a number of 
small changes to the results for the wage equations for the native sample compared to 
the pooled male-female results that have been discussed above. For the migrant sample, 
only the returns to education and tenure are estimated with any precision and are 
significantly different from zero.  
     3.6.2.2 Twofold Decomposition 
The top panel of Table 3.8 provides information on the average earnings for the two 
groups in the three selected years of study. It also provides the difference between the 
earnings of the two groups and how much of this difference is due to the endowment 
effect, the explained portion, and how much of this difference is due to the coefficient 
effect, labelled as unexplained. The next two panels are divided between the make-up 




gap in wages in the third panel. The top panel shows that the insignificant gap between 
male migrants and natives in 2001 is the result of higher endowments of migrants 
(explained) offset by higher returns to these endowments of natives (unexplained).  By 
2006 and continuing into 2011, the pattern changes noticeably: the wage gap is in 
favour of natives by about 7-8% in both years, driven by an increase in the gap deriving 
from the coefficients (the contribution of the endowments themselves is essentially 
unchanged throughout the period under study, at about 10% in favour of the migrant 
group). 
The explained part of the gap is presented in the second panel of the twofold 
decomposition. Only two of the differences in the initial endowments are statistically 
significant in all of the three years for which the decomposition has been estimated. The 
first of these is the gap for education that, on average, the two groups have. It can be 
seen from Table 3.8 that the contribution that the amount of education that the native 
group has is substantially less than that of the migrant group. Table 1b shows that over 
the three years for which results have been shown, the male migrant group has about 
two years more education than the equivalent native group and that the contribution of 
this gap in endowments shown in Table 3.8 is always significant at the 0.1% level. The 
other gap in endowments that is noteworthy is the gap in tenure. The contribution of 
tenure is always in favour of the male native group over the three years. This gap is 
increasing in each of the three years, starting off at 0.0428 log points in 2001 and rising 
to 0.0498 log points by 2011. 
The bottom panel of Table 3.8 show the results for the twofold decompositions 
unexplained component, or the gap in the estimated coefficients. In the bottom panel, 
it can be seen that for the male group, differences in the return to education between the 
two groups do not contribute in a statistically significant way to the wage gap. Tenure, 
however, is important: the return to tenure for migrant males is significantly larger 
compared to that for native males in 2006 (-0.0845 log points) and 2011 and (-0.552 
log points). 
    3.6.2.3 Threefold Decomposition 
The full threefold decomposition for males can now be examined. The top panel again 
provides the average wage that is received by the two groups, the difference between 




wages and the gaps in the endowments, coefficients and the interaction between the 
two. In 2001, the insignificant gap between male migrants and male natives is the result 
of higher endowments that favour male migrants being offset by higher returns to these 
endowments for the native group.  In 2006 and 2011 the pattern changes: a gap in favour 
of natives emerges, driven by higher returns to endowments and only partly offset by 
interaction effects. 
The second panel allows a look into the weighted gaps of the initial endowments that 
the two groups have, on average.  The key pattern here is the emergence of a gap 
attributable to job tenure: the tenure endowment contributions to the wage gap are 0.162 
and 0.116 for 2006 and 2011. The two gaps in 2006 and 2011 are precisely determined, 
with standard errors of about 0.025 and 0.027.  This gap in tenure makes sense: Table 
3.3 shows that the majority of migrants in 2001 had arrived from Western Europe, but 
by 2011 this had changed to the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 
respectively. These new workers were recent arrivals and would have only started to 
accumulate tenure after their arrival. 
The third panel of Table 3.9 shows that although the endowments of tenure of newly 
arrived migrant males was lower than that of natives as just noted, the returns to tenure 
for these migrants was higher than for native males: -0.0845 log points in 2006 
and -0.0552 log points in 2011.  The final panel of Table 3.9 gives the details of the 
interaction terms.  Again, the pattern for tenure is noteworthy and similar to that for the 
contribution of the job tenure coefficients, i.e. in favour of migrants: -0.123 log points 
in 2006 and -0.0660 in 2011.   
    3.6.2.4 Counterfactuals 
The counterfactual estimates were repeated for the male-only grouping.  This shows 
much the same picture as the overall group estimates of the counterfactual average 
earnings if the two groups were rewarded on the basis of the other groups’ returns to 
the various endowments.  Table 3.13 shows that in 2001, when the migrant endowments 
are combined with the native coefficients, the earnings, in order to provide the 
counterfactual, the differential between the two groups hardly changes: 1.83 log points 
(£6.23) vs. the actual log wage of 1.84 log points (£6.30). However by 2006 the migrant 





We now repeat the exercise using the endowments for the native group combined with 
the coefficients that are estimated for the migrant group. A very similar story emerges 
for the native counterfactual in 2001 as was given for the migrant counterfactual, 
namely almost no change: the counterfactual for male native earnings would be 1.77 
log points (£5.87) vs. the actual 1.76 log points (£5.81).  For later years, the native 
group takes an earnings penalty with the estimated counterfactuals being 1.84 log points 
(£6.30) earned by the native group of males in 2006 and 1.98 log points (£7.24) in 2011. 
3.6.3 Female Decomposition 
    3.6.3.1 OLS Results 
Table 3.10 provides the results for the wage equations, separately, for the female 
subpopulations of both natives and migrants.  As can be seen from the table, all of the 
OLS coefficient estimates for the native group are precisely estimated and statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level.  The coefficients for the migrant group are less precisely 
estimated, again as before due to the smaller sample size. The return to a migrant’s 
education is always statistically significantly different from zero and is similar in 
magnitude to the estimated return to education for natives.  The pattern for the return 
to tenure is also noteworthy.  For natives, it is consistently about 1% across the period 
analysed.  For migrants, in 2001 it is, statistically, no different from zero, but in 2006 
and 2011 it is significant at the 0.1% level, with the levels estimated for 2006 and 2011 
being equal to 0.0326 and 0.0236 respectfully, and so larger than the return to tenure 
for natives. 
    3.6.3.2 Twofold Decomposition 
The results from the female-only twofold decomposition are presented in Table 3.11.  
As can be seen in the top panel the results show that, much like in the overall 
decomposition, migrant women earn 12% more than natives in 2001, a gap that is 
significantly different from zero.  By 2006 this gap has disappeared – it is only about 
2% and not significantly different from zero – and by 2011 it has reversed, with a 
statistically significant gap of about 6% in favour of natives. 
The rest of the top panel splits these differences into explained and unexplained 
components.  It shows that the explained component (endowments) is consistently in 




in 2006 and -0.107 in 2011.  By contrast, the unexplained component (coefficients) 
starts in 2001 at only 0.0295 and insignificantly different from zero, but then increases 
to 0.108 i.e. in favour of native women and then further in favour of natives to 0.165 in 
2011.  These overall explained and unexplained components are precisely estimated, 
with standard errors of 0.1-0.4. 
Investigating the second panel of Table 3.11, we can see what variables that most of the 
gap derives from for the explained part of the decomposition.  There are only two 
variables that are consistently significantly different from zero over the three years, and 
they contribute in opposite directions to each other.  The first of these initial 
endowments, and one that favours the migrant cohort, is for the amount of education 
that the two groups have, on average.  The estimated contribution of the gap in the 
endowment of years of education in 2001 is equal to -0.166, falling slightly to -0.149 
in 2006 and -0.142 in 2011.  All three of these estimated gaps in the endowments of 
education are significant at the 0.1% level. 
The other variable that is consistently significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level 
is the endowment of tenure.  Here the contribution consistently favours natives, and to 
an increasing extent.  This variable starts at 0.0153 in 2001, increasing to 0.0291 in 
2006 and to 0.0405 in 2011. 
I now consider the unexplained gaps.  Again, the key variables with coefficients that 
are estimated precisely and are different from zero are education and tenure.  The gap 
relating to the return to tenure is not significantly different from zero in 2001, but the 
gaps become significant and negative in 2006 and 2011 at -0.0322 and -0.0537, 
respectively.  These gaps both favour the migrant population over the native population. 
The pattern with respect to education shows larger movements between periods – a very 
large contribution in favour of natives in 2001, then a contribution that is insignificantly 
different from zero in 2006, then another large contribution in 2011.  This is attributable 
in part to imprecise estimates and large standard errors. 
    3.6.3.3 Threefold Decomposition 
We can now move on to the results for the threefold decomposition in Table 3.12.  We 
have, again, the details of the average hourly wages that are received by both the native 




of endowments, coefficients, and interactions. In 2001, the -0.121 log point’s gap in 
favour of female migrants is largely attributable to the interaction of endowments and 
coefficients, at -0.110 log points; neither endowments nor coefficients on their own 
contribute anything significantly different from zero. The main difference in 2006 and 
2011 is the increasing contribution of coefficients in favour of female migrants, to 0.108 
in 2006 and 0.165 in 2011, both precisely determined and significantly different from 
zero.  The contributions of endowments and endowment-coefficient interactions in 
favour of migrant women is enough to offset this in 2006, but by 2011 it the coefficient 
effect in favour of native women dominates both the endowment and  interaction effects 
in favour of migrant women (the pure endowment effect is negligible in 2011). 
If the gaps attributable to endowments in the second panel of Table 3.12 are examined, 
it can be seen that education endowments contribute in favour of migrant women: in all 
three years, foreign women have a higher level of education than native females, or 
have at least attended school for longer.  Tenure, by contrast, contributes in favour of 
the native female population, and increasingly so: by 0.0203 log points in 2001, rising 
to 0.0941 in 2011. 
The results for the gaps in the estimated coefficients are in the third panel of Table 3.12. 
We now need to review the results for the interaction between the gap in endowments 
and the gap in coefficients, presented in the bottom panel. 
3.6.3.4 Counterfactuals 
Counterfactuals were estimated, once again, for the female groupings over the study 
period.  Once again a very similar story is told.  The third row estimate the earnings 
that female migrants would earn if they were rewarded like their equivalent natives. 
Table 3.13 shows that for the migrant female group, if they were rewarded for their 
endowments at the same rates as the native group they would be earning substantially 
more than they actually are earning.  If the native female cohort had the same 
coefficients as the migrant group, they would be earning less than they currently do. 
For instance, in 2001 the estimated counterfactual for the migrant group would have 
been 1.96 log points (£7.10) instead of the 1.805 log points (£6.08) that they actually 
earned. In 2006 the female group of migrants were still be earning more than the native 




they would have earned 2.08 log points or £8.00 if they had the same returns as the 
native group who only actually earned 1.881 log points (£6.56).  This shows, like in all 
of the 2001 average wage level counterfactuals, that if the migrants were rewarded for 
their level of skill as the native cohort are, then the gap between the two pay levels 
would have grown. 
 3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the reader that between the years of 2001 and 2011, the 
accession of the new member states to the European Union has dramatically changed 
the relative positions, at the mean, of the pay rates between native and migrant workers.  
Table 3.2 shows the reader that as the proportion of migrants in the UK being employed 
as Managers and Directors has fallen, from 11.6% in 2001 and by 2011 this number 
was only 4%.  The opposite has occurred in Elementary occupations, with the 
proportion of the migrant sample employed in these jobs has increased from 16.9% 
going up to 23.1%. This change obviously took time to have an effect on the overall 
wages. As can be seen by 2006, in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which looks at the overall average 
wages of natives and migrants, the migrant wage is surpassed by the native worker’s 
average wage.  However, the chapter then goes onto investigate whether this holds true 
for both genders.  
The next few Tables then present the same analysis but independently for the two 
genders.  Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that the male populations of workers show much the 
same pattern as the overall decomposition.  A different story emerges for the female 
populations as, even in 2006; the average native females are earning less than an 
equivalent migrant female.  This shows that the two genders are exhibiting a difference 
to the male workers in terms of time taken, with native female wages taking a little bit 
longer to catch and then surpass the average wages of the female migrant population. 
It would appear from the results of the decompositions that the most important aspects 
are an individual’s education and the amount of tenure that they have accrued working 
in the job in which they are currently employed.  The amount of education that an 
individual has is as important for the native population and for the migrant cohort before 
the expansion of the EU that began in 2004.  We can see this as before the expansion 
of the EU, the levels of a migrants education easily outstrips the level of education that 




This, however, does not continue after 2004 with the expansion of the EU brought a 
new wave of migration deriving, in most part, from the new EU member states.  If Table 
1a is examined it can be seen that the migrant population seems to continue to have 2 
more years in education over what the average British person has.  However the largest 
gap in education, between native and migrant cohorts, occurs in the male population in 
2011 with a gap of 3.59 years in the average level of education, with migrant workers 
averaging 15.29 years and the average for the native population at only 12.7 years. 
The information that is presented in this chapter shows how the expansion of the EU 
has had an effect on the relative position of native and migrants’ workers.  This can also 
be seen in the various subpopulations presented in Figure 2.1.  This figure agrees with 
the analysis that I have presented in this chapter.  It shows that the native male 
population was earning more than the equivalent migrant was in 2006 and that this gap 
persisted with an increase in the gap in the years after this analysis finished, after 2011.  
It does however have slightly different conclusions about the female population.  The 
figures presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show that the native female population is 































The second chapter applies the model developed by Borjas and Bratsberg, (1996), to 
data from the UK, in the period from 29/04/01 until 27/04/11. The analysis required the 
construction of a new and unique data set.  This required combining a diverse range of 
other data sources including information from the 2011 UK census and information 
derived from the UK government’s Department for Work and Pensions.  These two 
data sources were used in order to calculate the rate of return migration for the 93 
countries that were studied.  The construction these data also allows the potential to 
look at the average selection that decides the type of migrant that comes from particular 
countries, on average. 
I find that the two biggest factors that can affect outmigration rates, for different groups, 
are the distance between the source capital and London and the gap between the source 
and host countries GDP in 2011.  The marginal effects of an increase in distance was 
found to be 692 more individuals returning home if the source country was 1000 miles 
further away from the UK.  There was a larger reaction to the narrowing of the gap in 
the two countries GDP.  It is found that if the gap closed by 1% there would be an 
additional 1091 individuals returning to the source country. 
I also estimated the marginal effects of the change in variables for the two largest 
migrant cohorts in the UK over the time being selected for study, Poland and India. 
These two countries reinforce many of the points from the initial paper by Borjas and 
Bratsberg.  Distance from London, which was selected as a proxy for travel costs, to 
New Dehli is over 5000 miles more than it is to Warsaw, and is therefore considered 
more expensive to travel from/to.  Almost twice as many people are going to travel 
between the capital of India (10904) and London than would between the London and 
Warsaw (5760). 
Once we look at the two countries differing reactions to a decrease in the gap between 
the GDP of host and source country it can is observed that the same reaction is being 
experienced by migrants of India and Poland.  If there is a decrease in the GDP gap 
between India and the UK this is estimated to induce 17204 more individuals to return 
to India.  The same situation happening between the UK and Poland and is estimated 
to lead to 9087 more Poles returning to their source country. 
In the Third chapter, I show the reader that between the years of 2001 and 2011, the 




positions, at the mean, of the pay rates between native and migrant workers. Table 3.2 
shows the reader that as the proportion of migrants in the UK being employed as 
Managers and Directors has fallen, from 11.6% in 2001 by 2011 this number was only 
4%. The opposite has occurred in Elementary occupations, with the proportion of the 
migrant sample employed in these jobs has increased from 16.9% up to 23.1%. This 
change obviously took time to have an effect on the overall wages. As can be seen by 
2006, in Tables 5 and 6, which looks at the overall average wages of natives and 
migrants, the migrant wage is surpassed by the native worker’s average wage. However, 
the chapter then goes onto investigate whether this holds true for both genders.  
The next few Tables then present the same analysis but independently for the two 
genders. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that the male populations of workers show much the 
same pattern as the overall decomposition. A different story emerges for the female 
populations as, even in 2006; native females are earning less than a migrant female. 
This shows that the two genders are exhibiting a major difference to the male workers, 
with native female wages taking a little bit longer to catch and then surpass the average 
wages of the female migrant population. 
It would appear from the results of the decompositions that the most important aspects 
are an individual’s education and the amount of tenure that they have accrued working 
in the job in which they are currently employed. The amount of education that an 
individual has can be seen as important for the native population and for the migrant 
cohort before the expansion of the EU that began in 2004. We can see this as before the 
expansion of the EU, the levels of a migrants education easily outstrips the level of 
education that a native worker has.  
This, however, does not continue after 2004 with the expansion of the EU brought a 
new wave of migration deriving in most part from the new EU member states. If Table 
1a is examined it can be seen that the migrant population seems to continue to have 2 
more years in education over what the average British person has. However the largest 
gap in education, between native and migrant cohorts, occurs in the male population in 
2011 with a gap of 3.59 years in the average level of education, with migrant workers 
averaging 15.29 years and the average for the native population at only 12.7 years. 
The information that is presented in this chapter shows how the expansion of the EU 




also be seen in the various subpopulations presented in Figure 2.1. This figure agrees 
with the analysis that I have presented in this chapter. It shows that the native male 
population were earning more than the equivalent migrant was in 2006 and that this 
gap persisted with a small increase in the gap in the years after this analysis finished, 
after 2011. It does however have slightly different conclusions about the female 
population. The figures presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show that the native female 
population is earning more than the migrant population by 2011. 
Additional avenues for further research include investigating wage decomposition 
based on individuals’ occupation the same way that Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) 
did in their original paper. This would allow for the analysis of how occupational 
































Table A1 – Determinants of Outmigration and In-Migration Rates 
Note: the t-ratios are reported in parenthesis. The weighted regressions weigh the observations by the size of the immigrant flow 
in the outmigration equation, and by the size of the source countries population in the in-migration regression. The regressions 

















































































































































R2 0.439 0.512 0.310 … 0.242 0.276 0.242 … 




Table 2.1 – Regression upon in and out migration rates 
 Out Migration Immigration 
 Grouped Probit Grouped Probit WLS Grouped Probit Grouped Probit WLS 
  With robust standard 
errors 
  With robust standard 
errors 
 
Distance in 000s 
miles 
0.0495*** 0.0495** 0.0490*** -0.0772*** -0.0772 -0.112*** 
 (0.000292) (0.0161) (0.0122) (0.0000951) (0.0477) (0.0171) 
       
GDP Gap in 2011 0.0781*** 0.0781 0.0672 -0.164*** -0.164 -0.205** 
 (0.00182) (0.0813) (0.0763) (0.000376) (0.0915) (0.0755) 
       
Political Stability 0.00333*** 0.00333 0.00312 -0.0157*** -0.0157** -0.0147*** 
 (0.0000835) (0.00309) (0.00350) (0.0000199) (0.00597) (0.00381) 
       
Income 
Inequality 
-0.00832*** -0.00832 -0.00840 -0.00130*** -0.00130 -0.000329 
 (0.000239) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0000564) (0.0163) (0.0104) 
       
Income 
Inequality2 
0.000128*** 0.000128 0.000131 0.00000701*** 0.00000701 0.0000443 
 (0.00000352) (0.000141) (0.000149) (0.000000837) (0.000211) (0.000153) 
       
Constant -0.312*** -0.312* -0.314* -2.215*** -2.215*** -2.407*** 
 (0.00323) (0.153) (0.136) (0.000728) (0.260) (0.134) 
N 3244601 3244601 91 5958273174 5958273174 91 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 2.2  – Marginal Effects of independent variables 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
Variables Maximum Likelihood  Maximum Likelihood with Cluster 
Robust Estimation of the Variance 




















































































































































































































Figure 2.1 (Positive Selection)  
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Figure 2.2 (Negative Selection)    
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Natives and Migrants (totals and by gender) 
a) 3.1.1 Total Sample of Natives & Migrants 







2001 2006 2011 




































































































b) 3.1.2 Male Natives & Migrants 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
Men 2001 2006 2011 




































































































 c) 3.1.3 Female Natives & Migrants 
Women 2001 2006 2011 
































































































N= 3920 197 5016 384 4719 526 





Table 3.2 - Occupational Distribution of the Different Groups 
 2001 2006 2011 
 2001 2006 2011 























































































































N= 9912 414 12165 781 11018 1118 
This table shows the raw numbers employed in the different occupations. The percentages that are 













Table 3.3 – Percentage that have Migrated from various World Regions 
 2001 2006 2011 
Western EU 23.6 27 21.1 
Eastern EU 1.1 9.8 29.3 
Europe non-EU 5 1.8 2.2 
North America 7.6 4.9 3.5 
South America 2.3 1.1 1.9 
Australasia 9 5.3 2.1 
Africa 18.8 15.2 12.5 
Asia non Middle East 18.6 19.3 19.9 
Middle East 2 1.8 1.4 
Caribbean 4.2 2.8 1.7 
Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 






Table 3.4 – OLS results for Natives and Migrants (Total Populations) 
 2001 2006 2011 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 
Education 0.0718*** 0.0491*** 0.0617*** 0.0554*** 0.0602*** 0.0433*** 
 (0.00203) (0.00843) (0.00172) (0.00563) (0.00185) (0.00472) 
       
Experience 0.0146*** 0.00244 0.00481*** 0.00254 0.00705*** 0.00619 
 (0.00130) (0.00941) (0.00127) (0.00639) (0.00137) (0.00492) 
       
Experience2 -0.000360*** -0.0000427 -0.000160*** -0.0000544 -0.000185*** -0.000151 
 (0.0000325) (0.000239) (0.0000297) (0.000165) (0.0000330) (0.000132) 
       
Tenure 0.0115*** 0.0133** 0.00806*** 0.0231*** 0.00975*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.000612) (0.00459) (0.000564) (0.00360) (0.000604) (0.00299) 
       
Married 0.0458*** -0.00360 0.0715*** 0.0259 0.0697*** 0.0426 
 (0.00964) (0.0601) (0.00840) (0.0372) (0.00913) (0.0294) 
       
Female -0.150*** -0.0839 -0.162*** -0.0903* -0.116*** -0.106*** 
 (0.00899) (0.0560) (0.00803) (0.0357) (0.00878) (0.0287) 
       
constant 0.779*** 1.105*** 1.171*** 1.056*** 1.235*** 1.280*** 
 (0.0304) (0.159) (0.0296) (0.116) (0.0320) (0.0950) 
Marg. eff. 0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0007 0.0018 
of experience (0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0021) 
N 9912 414 12165 781 11018 1118 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 3.5 – Twofold Wage Decomposition with Natives Non-Discriminatory Wage 
Regression 
 2001 2006 2011 
Overall    
Native 1.752*** 1.958*** 2.097*** 
 (0.00481) (0.00432) (0.00468) 
Migrant 1.835*** 1.944*** 2.037*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0195) (0.0153) 
Difference -0.0826** 0.0144 0.0593*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0200) (0.0160) 
Explained -0.142*** -0.130*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0104) (0.00870) 
unexplained 0.0598* 0.144*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0193) (0.0163) 
Explained    
Education -0.154*** -0.145*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0101) (0.00874) 
Experience -0.00139 -0.00557** 0.00193 
 (0.00246) (0.00202) (0.00240) 
Tenure 0.0261*** 0.0332*** 0.0439*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00284) (0.00308) 
Married -0.00103 0.000762 -0.000366 
 (0.00113) (0.00128) (0.00107) 
Female -0.0121** -0.0129*** -0.00489** 
 (0.00384) (0.00306) (0.00186) 
Coefficients    
Education 0.322* 0.0923 0.256** 
 (0.143) (0.0880) (0.0885) 
Experience 0.0760 0.00152 0.00221 
 (0.0747) (0.0460) (0.0331) 
Tenure -0.00822 -0.0560*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0123) (0.0143) 
Married 0.0311 0.0283 0.0164 
 (0.0374) (0.0233) (0.0178) 
Female -0.0349 -0.0365 -0.00511 
 (0.0304) (0.0188) (0.0158) 
_cons -0.326 0.115 -0.0444 
 (0.190) (0.118) (0.111) 
N 10326 12946 12136 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 3.6 – Threefold Wage Decomposition 
 2001 2006 2011 
Overall    
Natives 1.752*** 1.958*** 2.097*** 
 (0.00481) (0.00432) (0.00468) 
Migrants 1.835*** 1.944*** 2.037*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0195) (0.0153) 
Difference -0.0826** 0.0144 0.0593*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0200) (0.0160) 
endowments -0.0806*** -0.0406* -0.00703 
 (0.0224) (0.0178) (0.0192) 
coefficients 0.0598* 0.144*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0193) (0.0163) 
interaction -0.0617** -0.0893*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0169) (0.0192) 
Explained    
Endowments -0.0806*** -0.0406* -0.00703 
 (0.0224) (0.0178) (0.0192) 
Interaction -0.0617** -0.0893*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0169) (0.0192) 
Endowments    
Education -0.105*** -0.131*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0152) (0.0144) 
Experience 0.00107 0.00193 0.00356 
 (0.00499) (0.00781) (0.00773) 
Tenure 0.0302** 0.0950*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0138) (0.0156) 
Married 0.0000809 0.000276 -0.000224 
 (0.00132) (0.000605) (0.000670) 
Female -0.00674 -0.00716* -0.00449* 
 (0.00505) (0.00330) (0.00206) 
Coefficients    
Education 0.322* 0.0923 0.256** 
 (0.143) (0.0880) (0.0885) 
Experience 0.0760 0.00152 0.00221 
 (0.0747) (0.0460) (0.0331) 
Tenure -0.00822 -0.0560*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0123) (0.0143) 
Married 0.0311 0.0283 0.0164 
 (0.0374) (0.0233) (0.0178) 
Female -0.0349 -0.0365 -0.00511 
 (0.0304) (0.0188) (0.0158) 
constant -0.326 0.115 -0.0444 
 (0.190) (0.118) (0.111) 
Interaction    
Education -0.0487* -0.0148 -0.0427** 
 (0.0221) (0.0142) (0.0149) 
Experience -0.00246 -0.00750 -0.00163 
 (0.00540) (0.00806) (0.00805) 
Tenure -0.00408 -0.0618*** -0.0593*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0155) 
Married -0.00111 0.000486 -0.000143 
 (0.00179) (0.000909) (0.000444) 
Female -0.00535 -0.00571 -0.000407 
 (0.00494) (0.00321) (0.00127) 
N 10326 12946 12136 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 3.7 – OLS Results for Male Sample of Natives & Migrants 
 2001 2006 2011 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 
Education 0.0721*** 0.0729*** 0.0596*** 0.0573*** 0.0623*** 0.0496*** 
 (0.00309) (0.0123) (0.00261) (0.00813) (0.00277) (0.00645) 
       
Experience 0.0243*** -0.00566 0.0136*** -0.00543 0.0134*** 0.0167* 
 (0.00215) (0.0147) (0.00207) (0.00892) (0.00220) (0.00727) 
       
Experience2 -0.000575*** 0.000227 -0.000375*** 0.000125 -0.000306*** -0.000396* 
 (0.0000522) (0.000368) (0.0000474) (0.000221) (0.0000516) (0.000191) 
       
Tenure 0.0129*** 0.0115 0.00791*** 0.0326*** 0.0101*** 0.0236*** 
 (0.000985) (0.00715) (0.000885) (0.00585) (0.000945) (0.00450) 
       
Married 0.123*** -0.0363 0.144*** 0.0445 0.0938*** 0.000896 
 (0.0170) (0.0930) (0.0143) (0.0538) (0.0151) (0.0442) 
       
constant 0.650*** 0.832*** 1.093*** 1.040*** 1.134*** 1.137*** 
 (0.0460) (0.228) (0.0451) (0.166) (0.0480) (0.131) 
Marg. eff. 0.0721 0.0729 0.0007 -0.0022 0.003 0.007 
of experience (0.0035) (0.0137) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0008) (0.0023) 
N 3920 197 5016 384 4719 526 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.8 – Twofold Wage Decomposition Male Natives & Migrants with Natives as 
Non-discriminatory Group 
 2001 2006 2011 
overall    
Natives 1.857*** 2.068*** 2.174*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00706) (0.00754) 
Migrants 1.868*** 1.989*** 2.101*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0284) (0.0229) 
difference -0.0106 0.0792** 0.0735** 
 (0.0472) (0.0293) (0.0241) 
explained -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0143) (0.0133) 
unexplained 0.0931* 0.180*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0279) (0.0246) 
Explained    
Education -0.133*** -0.138*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0141) (0.0137) 
Experience -0.0105 -0.00711 0.00827* 
 (0.00562) (0.00388) (0.00395) 
Tenure 0.0428*** 0.0393*** 0.0498*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00486) (0.00488) 
Married -0.00307 0.00498 0.00154 
 (0.00433) (0.00372) (0.00211) 
Coefficients    
Education -0.0113 0.0329 0.194 
 (0.199) (0.120) (0.133) 
Experience 0.179 0.116 -0.0183 
 (0.119) (0.0668) (0.0531) 
Tenure 0.00608 -0.0845*** -0.0552** 
 (0.0324) (0.0188) (0.0208) 
Married 0.102 0.0620 0.0571* 
 (0.0630) (0.0340) (0.0280) 
constant -0.182 0.0530 -0.00322 
 (0.277) (0.161) (0.165) 
N 4117 5400 5245 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 3.9 - Threefold Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition for Male Natives & Migrants 
 2001 2006 2011 
Overall    
Natives 1.857*** 2.068*** 2.174*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00706) (0.00754) 
Migrants 1.868*** 1.989*** 2.101*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0284) (0.0229) 
difference -0.0106 0.0792** 0.0735** 
 (0.0472) (0.0293) (0.0241) 
endowments -0.0848* 0.0295 -0.00436 
 (0.0383) (0.0319) (0.0291) 
coefficients 0.0931* 0.180*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0279) (0.0246) 
interaction -0.0189 -0.130*** -0.0968*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0306) (0.0292) 
Explained    
Endowment -0.0848* 0.0295 -0.00436 
 (0.0383) (0.0319) (0.0291) 
Interaction -0.0189 -0.130*** -0.0968*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0306) (0.0292) 
Endowments    
Education -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0209) (0.0224) 
Experience 0.0107 -0.00149 0.00778 
 (0.00943) (0.0121) (0.0113) 
Tenure 0.0380 0.162*** 0.116*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0250) 
Married 0.000908 0.00155 0.0000147 
 (0.00273) (0.00214) (0.000703) 
Coefficients    
Education -0.0113 0.0329 0.194 
 (0.199) (0.120) (0.133) 
Experience 0.179 0.116 -0.0183 
 (0.119) (0.0668) (0.0531) 
Tenure 0.00608 -0.0845*** -0.0552** 
 (0.0324) (0.0188) (0.0208) 
Married 0.102 0.0620 0.0571* 
 (0.0630) (0.0340) (0.0280) 
constant -0.182 0.0530 -0.00322 
 (0.277) (0.161) (0.165) 
Interaction    
Education 0.00149 -0.00515 -0.0328 
 (0.0261) (0.0188) (0.0226) 
Experience -0.0212 -0.00562 0.000494 
 (0.0115) (0.0129) (0.0115) 
Tenure 0.00475 -0.123*** -0.0660** 
 (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0249) 
Married -0.00398 0.00344 0.00152 
 (0.00610) (0.00316) (0.00221) 
N 4117 5400 5245 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.10 – OLS results for Female Natives & Migrants 
 2001 2011 2001 
 Natives Migrants Natives Migrants Natives Migrants 
Education 0.0701*** 0.0232* 0.0631*** 0.0530*** 0.0578*** 0.0356*** 
 (0.00268) (0.0115) (0.00230) (0.00787) (0.00249) (0.00696) 
       
Experience 0.00793*** 0.00624 -0.00183 0.0130 0.00237 -0.00379 
 (0.00163) (0.0120) (0.00160) (0.00934) (0.00176) (0.00673) 
       
Experience2 -0.000214*** -0.000263 0.000000683 -0.000313 -0.0000987* 0.0000882 
 (0.0000412) (0.000309) (0.0000379) (0.000249) (0.0000429) (0.000183) 
       
Tenure 0.0102*** 0.0135* 0.00847*** 0.0165*** 0.00965*** 0.0224*** 
 (0.000782) (0.00585) (0.000732) (0.00458) (0.000782) (0.00399) 
       
Married -0.00188 0.0141 0.0251* 0.00403 0.0509*** 0.0771 
 (0.0114) (0.0779) (0.0102) (0.0520) (0.0113) (0.0395) 
       
constant 0.740*** 1.395*** 1.066*** 0.971*** 1.206*** 1.334*** 
 (0.0390) (0.221) (0.0380) (0.160) (0.0418) (0.134) 
Marg. eff. 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0044 -0.0011 -0.0016 
of experience (0.0006) (0.005) (0.00058) (0.0034) (0.0006) (0.0026) 
N 5992 217 7149 397 6299 592 
   Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.11 - Twofold Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition for Female Natives & Migrants 
 2001 2006 2011 
overall    
Natives 1.684*** 1.881*** 2.038*** 
 (0.00563) (0.00524) (0.00583) 
Migrants 1.805*** 1.900*** 1.981*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0268) (0.0204) 
difference -0.121** -0.0191 0.0574** 
 (0.0374) (0.0273) (0.0212) 
explained -0.151*** -0.127*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0140) (0.0108) 
unexplained 0.0295 0.108*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0270) (0.0217) 
Explained    
Education -0.166*** -0.149*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0143) (0.0110) 
Experience 0.0000967 -0.00737** -0.00503 
 (0.00204) (0.00250) (0.00311) 
Tenure 0.0153*** 0.0291*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00359) (0.00401) 
Married 0.0000347 -0.000129 -0.00103 
 (0.000219) (0.000631) (0.00110) 
Coefficients    
Education 0.669*** 0.147 0.331** 
 (0.198) (0.128) (0.117) 
Experience 0.0417 -0.115 0.0297 
 (0.0915) (0.0648) (0.0415) 
Tenure -0.0162 -0.0322* -0.0537** 
 (0.0270) (0.0164) (0.0197) 
Married -0.00992 0.0130 -0.0157 
 (0.0431) (0.0319) (0.0229) 
constant -0.655* 0.0952 -0.127 
 (0.259) (0.174) (0.146) 
N 6209 7546 6891 
Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 3.12 - Threefold Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition for Female Natives & Migrants 
 2001 2006 2011 
Overall    
Natives 1.684*** 1.881*** 2.038*** 
 (0.00563) (0.00524) (0.00583) 
Migrants 1.805*** 1.900*** 1.981*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0268) (0.0204) 
difference -0.121** -0.0191 0.0574** 
 (0.0374) (0.0273) (0.0212) 
endowments -0.0404 -0.0621** 0.00176 
 (0.0296) (0.0209) (0.0250) 
coefficients 0.0295 0.108*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0270) (0.0217) 
interaction -0.110*** -0.0648** -0.109*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0203) (0.0252) 
Explained    
Endowments -0.404 -0.0621** 0.00176 
 (0.0296) (0.0209) (0.0250) 
Interaction -0.110 -0.0648** -0.109*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0203) (0.0252) 
Endowments    
Education -0.0549 -0.125*** -0.0872*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0217) (0.0183) 
Experience -0.00559 0.00608 -0.00353 
 (0.00677) (0.00999) (0.0103) 
Tenure 0.0203* 0.0566*** 0.0941*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0145) (0.0198) 
Married -0.000260 -0.0000208 -0.00156 
 (0.00135) (0.000280) (0.00179) 
Coefficients    
Education 0.669*** 0.147 0.331** 
 (0.198) (0.128) (0.117) 
Experience 0.0417 -0.115 0.0297 
 (0.0915) (0.0648) (0.0415) 
Tenure -0.0162 -0.0322* -0.0537** 
 (0.0270) (0.0164) (0.0197) 
Married -0.00992 0.0130 -0.0157 
 (0.0431) (0.0319) (0.0229) 
constant -0.655* 0.0952 -0.127 
 (0.259) (0.174) (0.146) 
Interaction    
Education -0.111** -0.0238 -0.0543** 
 (0.0350) (0.0208) (0.0194) 
Experience 0.00568 -0.0134 -0.00150 
 (0.00655) (0.0104) (0.0107) 
Tenure -0.00500 -0.0275 -0.0536** 
 (0.00847) (0.0141) (0.0197) 
Married 0.000295 -0.000108 0.000531 
 (0.00139) (0.000591) (0.000954) 
N 6209 7546 6891 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.13 – Predicted Average Wage Counterfactuals 
 Type of 
Counterfactual 















































































































* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
overall            
Natives 1.752*** 1.791*** 1.809*** 1.852*** 1.900*** 1.958*** 1.991*** 2.024*** 2.048*** 2.069*** 2.097*** 
 (0.00481) (0.00406) (0.00412) (0.00404) (0.00403) (0.00432) (0.00445) (0.00444) (0.00462) (0.00468) (0.00468) 
Migrants 1.835*** 1.848*** 1.901*** 1.869*** 1.903*** 1.944*** 1.966*** 1.993*** 1.990*** 1.989*** 2.037*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0205) (0.0218) (0.0231) (0.0207) (0.0195) (0.0182) (0.0165) (0.0177) (0.0160) (0.0153) 
difference -0.0826** -0.0578** -0.0920*** -0.0171 -0.00315 0.0144 0.0242 0.0310 0.0585** 0.0795*** 0.0593*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0209) (0.0221) (0.0234) (0.0211) (0.0200) (0.0187) (0.0171) (0.0183) (0.0167) (0.0160) 
explained -0.142*** -0.132*** -0.158*** -0.127*** -0.109*** -0.130*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.111*** -0.120*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0112) (0.00999) (0.0104) (0.00989) (0.00962) (0.00923) (0.00938) (0.00870) 
unexplained 0.0598* 0.0741*** 0.0659** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.144*** 0.159*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.200*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0204) (0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0188) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0171) (0.0163) 
explained            
Education -0.154*** -0.163*** -0.189*** -0.165*** -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.145*** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.00995) (0.0101) (0.00996) (0.00989) (0.00908) (0.00926) (0.00874) 
Experience -0.00139 0.00532* 0.00587* 0.00658** 0.00530* -0.00557** -0.00612* 0.0000117 0.00150 -0.00150 0.00193 
 (0.00246) (0.00218) (0.00228) (0.00247) (0.00221) (0.00202) (0.00253) (0.00255) (0.00216) (0.00251) (0.00240) 
Tenure 0.0261*** 0.0282*** 0.0310*** 0.0358*** 0.0420*** 0.0332*** 0.0350*** 0.0377*** 0.0406*** 0.0446*** 0.0439*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00319) (0.00310) (0.00320) (0.00295) (0.00284) (0.00301) (0.00306) (0.00322) (0.00335) (0.00308) 
Married -0.00103 0.000145 -0.00249* 0.000275 -0.00114 0.000762 0.000824 -0.00107 -0.00137 0.000654 -0.000366 
 (0.00113) (0.00107) (0.00118) (0.00130) (0.000735) (0.00128) (0.00135) (0.00105) (0.000980) (0.00116) (0.00107) 
Female -0.0121** -0.00217 -0.00306 -0.00433 -0.00482 -0.0129*** -0.0127*** -0.0112*** -0.00590* -0.00888*** -0.00489** 
 (0.00384) (0.00328) (0.00313) (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00306) (0.00235) (0.00257) (0.00235) (0.00231) (0.00186) 
unexplained            
Education 0.322* 0.227* 0.280** 0.151 0.160 0.0923 0.0759 0.178* 0.315*** 0.258** 0.256** 
 (0.143) (0.0939) (0.0979) (0.123) (0.0977) (0.0880) (0.0917) (0.0881) (0.0954) (0.0800) (0.0885) 
Experience 0.0760 -0.00164 -0.00332 -0.0480 0.0250 0.00152 -0.0135 -0.00829 0.0619 -0.00502 0.00221 
 (0.0747) (0.0383) (0.0444) (0.0534) (0.0392) (0.0460) (0.0433) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0344) (0.0331) 
Tenure -0.00822 -0.0232 -0.0173 -0.0306* -0.0544** -0.0560*** -0.0438** -0.0598*** -0.0522*** -0.0424*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0174) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0157) (0.0120) (0.0143) 
Married 0.0311 0.0474 0.0477 -0.00249 0.0153 0.0283 0.0447* 0.0240 0.0150 0.0333 0.0164 
 (0.0374) (0.0247) (0.0284) (0.0265) (0.0224) (0.0233) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0224) (0.0189) (0.0178) 
Female -0.0349 -0.0819*** -0.0418 -0.0228 -0.0802*** -0.0365 -0.0311 -0.0217 -0.0149 -0.0394* -0.00511 
 (0.0304) (0.0232) (0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0186) (0.0160) (0.0158) 
Constant -0.326 -0.0939 -0.200 0.0623 0.0409 0.115 0.127 0.0565 -0.156 -0.00513 -0.0444 
 (0.190) (0.114) (0.119) (0.158) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.113) (0.119) (0.0985) (0.111) 




Table 3.15 - Ten year Oaxaca-Blinder twofold decomposition (male population) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
overall            
Natives 1.857*** 1.901*** 1.914*** 1.940*** 1.993*** 2.068*** 2.076*** 2.125*** 2.136*** 2.154*** 2.174*** 
 (0.00833) (0.00670) (0.00672) (0.00674) (0.00662) (0.00706) (0.00757) (0.00748) (0.00764) (0.00775) (0.00754) 
Migrants 1.868*** 1.845*** 1.957*** 1.944*** 1.893*** 1.989*** 1.994*** 2.056*** 2.046*** 2.014*** 2.101*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0354) (0.0371) (0.0324) (0.0317) (0.0284) (0.0263) (0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0233) (0.0229) 
difference -0.0106 0.0556 -0.0430 -0.00444 0.100** 0.0792** 0.0815** 0.0692** 0.0902** 0.140*** 0.0735** 
 (0.0472) (0.0360) (0.0377) (0.0331) (0.0323) (0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0266) (0.0292) (0.0245) (0.0241) 
explained -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.156*** -0.133*** -0.0806*** -0.100*** -0.0983*** -0.128*** -0.103*** -0.0956*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0168) (0.0189) (0.0175) (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0133) 
unexplained 0.0931* 0.157*** 0.113** 0.129*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.236*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0335) (0.0361) (0.0322) (0.0314) (0.0279) (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0294) (0.0249) (0.0246) 
explained            
Education -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.194*** -0.180*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.141*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0164) (0.0188) (0.0175) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0137) 
Experience -0.0105 -0.00418 0.000801 0.00580 0.00853 -0.00711 -0.00572 -0.00583 0.00161 -0.00444 0.00827* 
 (0.00562) (0.00444) (0.00470) (0.00521) (0.00462) (0.00388) (0.00446) (0.00429) (0.00375) (0.00390) (0.00395) 
Tenure 0.0428*** 0.0367*** 0.0445*** 0.0437*** 0.0554*** 0.0393*** 0.0455*** 0.0368*** 0.0519*** 0.0458*** 0.0498*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00550) (0.00528) (0.00575) (0.00502) (0.00486) (0.00549) (0.00483) (0.00553) (0.00545) (0.00488) 
Married -0.00307 -0.00310 -0.00678 -0.00301 -0.00226 0.00498 -0.000313 -0.000868 -0.00478 0.00420 0.00154 
 (0.00433) (0.00434) (0.00356) (0.00363) (0.00263) (0.00372) (0.00304) (0.00282) (0.00318) (0.00305) (0.00211) 
unexplained            
Education -0.0113 0.0158 0.106 0.278 0.101 0.0329 -0.144 0.117 0.236 0.214 0.194 
 (0.199) (0.141) (0.151) (0.162) (0.139) (0.120) (0.134) (0.117) (0.152) (0.114) (0.133) 
Experience 0.179 0.0922 -0.00654 0.0258 0.112* 0.116 0.0102 0.0266 0.0896 0.0852 -0.0183 
 (0.119) (0.0674) (0.0713) (0.0756) (0.0569) (0.0668) (0.0594) (0.0599) (0.0632) (0.0520) (0.0531) 
Tenure 0.00608 -0.0422 -0.0230 -0.0352 -0.0613* -0.0845*** -0.0525** -0.0853*** -0.0566* -0.0460* -0.0552** 
 (0.0324) (0.0220) (0.0182) (0.0201) (0.0259) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0162) (0.0274) (0.0190) (0.0208) 
Married 0.102 0.138** 0.0812 0.0443 0.0452 0.0620 0.101** 0.100** 0.0447 0.0863** 0.0571* 
 (0.0630) (0.0448) (0.0489) (0.0467) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.0312) (0.0355) (0.0384) (0.0271) (0.0280) 
Constant -0.182 -0.0466 -0.0452 -0.184 -0.0162 0.0530 0.265 0.0381 -0.120 -0.104 -0.00322 
 (0.277) (0.181) (0.177) (0.193) (0.156) (0.161) (0.170) (0.146) (0.188) (0.137) (0.165) 
N 4117 5836 5849 5971 5875 5400 5770 5727 5478 5383 5245 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 3.16 - Ten year Oaxaca-Blinder twofold decomposition (female population) 
Standard errors in parentheses 




 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
overall            
Natives 1.684*** 1.711*** 1.735*** 1.789*** 1.833*** 1.881*** 1.929*** 1.951*** 1.983*** 2.005*** 2.038*** 
 (0.00563) (0.00486) (0.00502) (0.00485) (0.00490) (0.00524) (0.00524) (0.00524) (0.00558) (0.00565) (0.00583) 
Migrants 1.805*** 1.851*** 1.858*** 1.808*** 1.912*** 1.900*** 1.937*** 1.933*** 1.940*** 1.965*** 1.981*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0242) (0.0259) (0.0324) (0.0276) (0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0204) 
difference -0.121** -0.139*** -0.123*** -0.0188 -0.0789** -0.0191 -0.00772 0.0185 0.0428 0.0402 0.0574** 
 (0.0374) (0.0247) (0.0264) (0.0327) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0256) (0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0212) 
explained -0.151*** -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.115*** -0.121*** -0.127*** -0.143*** -0.128*** -0.109*** -0.125*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0108) 
unexplained 0.0295 0.0188 0.0359 0.0960** 0.0417 0.108*** 0.135*** 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0389) (0.0256) (0.0266) (0.0318) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0261) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0236) (0.0217) 
explained            
Education -0.166*** -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.138*** -0.166*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0129) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0110) 
Experience 0.0000967 0.00571* 0.00417 0.00346 0.00126 -0.00737** -0.00858** -0.00220 -0.00216 -0.00325 -0.00503 
 (0.00204) (0.00230) (0.00250) (0.00234) (0.00226) (0.00250) (0.00300) (0.00331) (0.00271) (0.00351) (0.00311) 
Tenure 0.0153*** 0.0215*** 0.0220*** 0.0297*** 0.0319*** 0.0291*** 0.0274*** 0.0382*** 0.0320*** 0.0439*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00372) (0.00368) (0.00361) (0.00350) (0.00359) (0.00342) (0.00398) (0.00382) (0.00430) (0.00401) 
Married 0.0000347 -0.000162 -0.000559 0.000676 0.000114 -0.000129 0.00139 -0.000529 -0.0000435 -0.000295 -0.00103 
 (0.000219) (0.000288) (0.000544) (0.000695) (0.000351) (0.000631) (0.00115) (0.000613) (0.000148) (0.000680) (0.00110) 
unexplained            
Education 0.669*** 0.449*** 0.475*** -0.0251 0.203 0.147 0.330** 0.243 0.406*** 0.287* 0.331** 
 (0.198) (0.122) (0.119) (0.184) (0.142) (0.128) (0.115) (0.136) (0.119) (0.113) (0.117) 
Experience 0.0417 -0.0806 0.0119 -0.119 -0.0517 -0.115 -0.00658 -0.0456 0.0406 -0.0806 0.0297 
 (0.0915) (0.0453) (0.0551) (0.0757) (0.0545) (0.0648) (0.0611) (0.0549) (0.0489) (0.0459) (0.0415) 
Tenure -0.0162 0.00364 -0.0148 -0.0228 -0.0477* -0.0322* -0.0340 -0.0334* -0.0493* -0.0378* -0.0537** 
 (0.0270) (0.0158) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0225) (0.0164) (0.0198) (0.0152) (0.0192) (0.0156) (0.0197) 
Married -0.00992 -0.00600 0.0277 -0.0317 -0.00635 0.0130 0.00501 -0.0297 0.00125 -0.0141 -0.0157 
 (0.0431) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0317) (0.0303) (0.0319) (0.0278) (0.0254) (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0229) 
Constant -0.655* -0.347* -0.464** 0.295 -0.0557 0.0952 -0.159 0.0124 -0.247 0.0109 -0.127 
 (0.259) (0.144) (0.149) (0.256) (0.176) (0.174) (0.165) (0.172) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) 
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